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Legislative Approaches to Marriage Penalty 
Relief: The Unintended Effects of Change on the 
Married Couple's Choice of Filing Status 
Amy C. Christian • 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article arises out of my participation in a symposium 
recorded in this issue of the New York Law School Journal of Human 
Rights. 1 At that symposium I spoke about how recent legislative 
efforts to reduce or eliminate the marriage penalty often have 
unintended, and occasionally egregious, consequences.2 The purpose 
of this Article is to analyze, in further detail, the provisions of 
marriage penalty relief proposals and to reveal some of those 
unintended consequences. 
The marriage penalty, as it is commonly conceived, is the 
phenomenon in which a married couple's tax liability exceeds the 
combined tax liabilities of two single people each earning the same 
incomes as the spouses. The couple is essentially penalized for 
marrying.3 The marriage penalty results not from any one provision 
• Professor of Law, Michigan State University, Detroit College of Law; 
B.S.B.A., Georgetown University, 1988; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1991. 
1 See Symposium, Women. Equity and Federal Tax Policy: Open Questions, 
16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. I 19 (1999). 
2 See Amy C. Christian, Unintended Consequences of Marriage Penalty 
Relief The Effect on the Married Couple's Choice of Filing Status, 16 N.Y.L. ScH. J. 
HUM. RTS. 172 (1999). 
3 See Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. 
REv. 1389, 1429-31 (1975), for an excellent explanation of the marriage penalty; see also 
Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: Family, Income-Sharing, and the 
Joint Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63, 94-96 (1993); Edward J. McCaffery, 
Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender Biases in the Code, 40 
UCLA L. REv. 983,989-96 (1993); Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 
S. CAL. L. REv. 339, 358-65 (1994). See generally Tax Treatment of Married, Head of 
Household, and Single Taxpayers: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and 
Means, 96th Cong. 231-320 (1980); Economic Problems of Women: Hearings Before the 
Joint £con. Comm., 93d Cong. 221-87, 604-09 (1973-1974); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON 
TAXATION, 96th CONG., 2D SESS., THE INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF MARRIED COUPLES 
AND SINGLE PERSONS 3-7 (Comm. Print 1980); U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR 
303 
HeinOnline -- 16 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 304 1999-2000
304 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XVI 
of the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC" or "code"). Rather, numerous 
code provisions contain characteristics that contribute to the marriage 
penalty.4 Furthermore, the marriage penalty was not enacted 
purposefully, but arises incidentally from many causes, including the 
mathematical impossibility for a tax system simultaneously to be 
progressive, to treat equal-income couples equally, and to be marriage 
neutral.5 The current tax system chooses progressivity and "couples' 
neutrality" at the expense of marriage neutrality.6 Sometimes code 
provisions interact in a manner that produces a marriage bonus. That 
is, a married couple's combined tax is less than the sum of their two 
tax liabilities had they remained single. Their liability declines upon 
marrying. Currently, it is estimated that approximately 21 million 
couples experience marriage penalties, while 25 million couples 
experience marriage bonuses.7 
BASIC TAX REFORM 102-07, 172-76 (1977); Z.l. GIRALDO, TAX POLICY AND THE DUAL-
INCOME FAMILY: THE "MARRIAGE TAX" AND OTHER INEQUITIES (Ctr. For the Study of the 
Family and the State, Policy Paper No. 3, 1978). 
4 See, e.g., James Edward Maule, Tax and Marriage: Unhitching the Horse 
and the Carriage - 'But Let There be Spaces in Your Togetherness, '67 TAX NOTES 539 
( 1995) (describing numerous tax provisions that contribute to marriage penalties). 
5 See Bittker, supra note 3, at 1395-96, 1429-31; see also Tax Treatment of 
Single Persons and Married Persons Where Both Spouses are Working: Hearings Before 
the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 92d Cong. 78-79 (1972) (statement of Edwin S. 
Cohen, Asst. Secretary for Tax Policy). "No algebraic equation, no matter how 
sophisticated, can solve this dilemma. Both ends of a seesaw cannot be up at the same 
time." Id. See also U.S. OEP'TOFTREASURY, supra note 3, at 102-03; Note, The Case for 
Mandatory Separate Filing by Married Persons, 91 YALE L.J. 363, 365 n.6 ( 1981) 
(conveying a mathematical proof demonstrating the impossibility of simultaneous 
achievement of marriage neutrality, couples neutrality, and progressivity). 
6 See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 3, at 1392-95; Amy C. Christian, The Joint 
Return Rate Structure: Identifying and Addressing the Gendered Nature of the Tax Law, 
13 J.L. & PoL. 241, 274 n.II8 (1997) ("The current rate structure, [for example,] ... 
permits equal-income couples to pay equal taxes (through income splitting], and, 
therefore, chooses the goal of 'couples neutrality' at the expense of 'marriage 
neutrality'."). 
7 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE: MARRIAGE AND 
THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX, at xiv (1997), available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT file. 
Of married taxpayers, 42% suffer marriage penalties, 51% enjoy marriage bonuses, and 
6% have tax liabilities equal to what their liabilities would amount to if single. See id. In 
1996, marriage penalties amounted to $29 billion in the aggregate, and marriage bonuses 
totaled $33 billion. See id. 
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In attempts to gain political capital in recent years, many 
members of Congress have proposed bills aimed at eliminating or 
reducing the unpopular marriage penalty.8 To date, none has been 
signed into law. In proposing to reform this aspect of the tax law, 
proposed legislation has taken a variety of approaches. The debate in 
the academic, political, and tax practice communities has usually 
centered around the extent to which a given proposal achieves its 
purported aim of making the tax system marriage neutral. Other 
questions addressed in tax jurisprudence include the following: 
Should concerns for · marriage neutrality outweigh the goals 
underlying couples neutrality or progressivity?9 Whom does the 
marriage penalty tend to burden, and whom does the marriage bonus 
usually benefit?10 Does marriage penalty relief constitute a penalty on 
single taxpayers? 11 
An issue that has been wholly overlooked in traditional 
analyses of marriage penalty relief is an analysis of how those relief 
proposals affect the incentive a married couple faces as to whether to 
file jointly or separately .12 Under the current tax system, the vast 
majority of married couples are encouraged to file jointly rather than 
separately. 13 Proposals to eliminate or lessen the marriage penalty 
8 . . 
See, e.g., H.R. 725, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 3524, 105th Cong. (1998); 
Taxpayer Relief and Protection Act of 1997, H.R. 2718, 105th Cong. § 3 (1997). 
9 See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 3, at 1395-96, 1429-31; Christian, supra note 
6, at 273 n.ll8. 
10 See Dorothy A. Brown, The Marriage Bonus/Penalty in Black and White, 
in TAXING AMERICA 45, 45-57 (Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows eds., 1996) 
(arguing African Americans tend to experience marriage penalties, while white 
Americans are more likely to experience marriage bonuses). 
11 See, e.g., Jonathan Barry Forman, What Can Be Done About Marriage 
Penalties?, 30 FAM. L.Q. I, 10 (1996) (acknowledging a reduction in marriage penalties 
could be perceived as a penalty on single persons); MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE DECLINE 
(AND FALL?) OF THE INCOME TAX 29-40 (1997) (describing single taxpayers' protest of 
the singles' penalty and the resulting marriage penalty); Nancy E. Shurtz, Gender Equity 
and Tax Policy: The Theory of "Taxing Men", 6 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN's STUD. 485, 
499 (1997) (describing rates prior to the 1969 advent of the marriage penalty as 
containing a "singles' penalty."). 
12 See Christian, supra note 2. 
13 See infra Part II.A.. 
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affect this incentive, in most cases intensifying it, 14 and in at least one 
instance diminishing it for some couples. 15 Most discussions of the 
marriage penalty ignore the effect of relief proposals on the choice of 
filing status. Yet it is an important issue. Examining the impact of 
legislation on the married couple's selection of filing status is crucial 
because important legal consequences flow from a decision to file 
jointly - specifically joint and several liability .16 Of particular 
concern is the fact that this liability regime is not merely onerous but · 
that it operates frequently to disadvantage women. Consequently, 
examining how legislative proposals modify the incentives between 
joint and separate filing is a worthy and important undertaking. 
This · Article will analyze various approaches to marriage 
penalty relief and will investigate the effect each type of legislative 
proposal would have on a couple's likelihood of filing jointly or 
separately. Part II will describe the motivation the current code 
provides to file jointly17 and will set forth the legal consequence a 
married couple experiences when it chooses to file jointly rather than 
separately, describing the rule of joint and several liability. 18 It will 
also elaborate briefly on the consequences women experience under 
that liability regime. 19 Part III first identifies the components of tax 
law that contribute to marriage penalties and marriage bonuses - the 
facets of tax law at which the proposals for relief are generally 
aimed.20 Part III then analyzes those particular proposals and their 
impact on the incentive for couples to file jointly rather than 
separately.21 Finally, Part IV concludes this Article, suggesting means 
by which Congress could address the marriage penalty and avoid the 
unintended negative consequences of previous proposals. 
14 See infra notes 44-131, 136-49 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 132-35 and accompanying text. 
16 See I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (1999) (imposing joint and several liability on 
couples who file a joint return). No analogous provision exists imposing joint and several 
liability on married separate filers. 
17 See infra notes 22-31 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 35-43 and accompanying text. 
·
20 See infra notes 44-49, 56-58, 68-88 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 50-55, 59-67, 89-149 and accompanying text. 
HeinOnline -- 16 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 307 1999-2000
1999] LEGISLATION AND FILING STATUS 307 
II. THE INCENTIVE TO FILE JOINTLY AND ITS LEGAL CONSEQUENCE: 
JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY 
A. The Incentive for Married Couples to File Jointly Rather than 
Separately 
An analysis of how measures for marriage penalty relief affect 
a couple's incentive to file jointly or separately necessarily begins 
with an examination of the current system's effect on the choice of 
filing status. The current rate structure encourages most couples to 
file joint returns, rather than separate ones, by establishing a lower tax 
liability under the joint return.22 This pattern emerges as a result of 
the relationship between tax rates under the joint return versus the 
rates that exist under the separate return. As I have explained 
previously: 
Joint and separate return rates ... [have been] related 
to each other [since 1948] by the concepts of income 
splitting and aggregation. Those two features are 
present in the joint return rates and cause a couple to 
be taxed under joint rates as if each spouse had earned 
separately half of the aggregate or combined net 
income. Income splitting permits income from the 
higher-bracket earner to be shifted into the other 
spouse's lower bracket for purposes of tax 
computation and effects a tax savings for the couple as 
a unit when the couple files jointly. Under 
aggregation, when spouses file jointly, their incomes 
22 See, e.g., Richard C.E. Beck, The Innocent Spouse Problem: Joint and 
Several Liability for Income Taxes Should be Repealed, 43 VAND. L. REV. 317, 372 
(1990) (explaining "[t]he tax system is designed almost to force married persons to file 
jointly, rather than separately .... "); Amy C. Christian, Joint and Several Liability and 
the Joint Return: Its Implications for Women, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 535, 601-02 (1998) 
[hereinafter Christian, Liability]; Amy C. Christian, Joint Versus Separate Filing: Joint 
Return Tax Rates and Federal Complicity in Directing Economic Resources from Women 
to Men, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 443, 447-48 (1997) [hereinafter Christian, 
Complicity); Christian, supra note 6, at 269-71; Harvey S. Rosen, Is It Time to Abandon 
Joint Filing?, 30 NAT'L TAX J. 423, 424-25 (1977). 
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are added together prior to the application of the tax 
rates. Because U.S. tax rates are progressive, 
aggregation causes some of the spouses' combined 
income to be taxed at higher marginal rates than would 
have applied to their incomes separately. Aggregation 
thereby imposes additional tax on couples who file 
jointly rather than separately. Income splitting and 
aggregation are both components of and are built into 
the joint return rates. That is, under joint filing, 
spouses are treated as one taxpayer, and that one 
taxpayer reports both sources of income, moving into 
a higher tax bracket. However, the tax rates rise half 
as quickly- that is, [joint] tax brackets are twice as 
wide relative to the rate schedule for married couples 
who file separately to allow for what is, in effect, 
income splitting. Joint return rates are related to 
separate return rates in that a joint return tax liability 
may be derived by applying the separate return tax 
rates to half of the spouses' combined net income and 
multiplying the resulting tax by two?3 
One consequence of income splitting and aggregation in the 
joint return rates is that they create an economic incentive for couples 
to file jointly rather than separately. This motivation exists whenever 
spouses' incomes differ, that is, whenever one spouse earns more than 
the other.24 And, in fact, "[t]he greater the income difference[] 
between husband and wife, the more valuable is the benefit from 
income splitting and the smaller is the harm from 'income aggregation, 
and thus, the greater is the couple's financial benefit from filing 
jointly rather than separately ."25 Only when spousal incomes ·are 
equal does the rate structure neither encourage· nor discourage the 
joint return relative to separate returns?6 Empirical data confirm the 
overpowering incentive within the code for married couples to file 
23 Christian, Complicity, supra note 22, at 444-45 (citations omitted). 
24 See id. at 447. 
25 /d. 
26 See id. See also Christian, supra note 6, at 269 tbl.2. 
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jointly rather than separately. In 1993, an estimated 97.5% of married 
couples selected the joint return filing status?7 
On occasion, however, married couples do file separately for 
reasons unrelated to the rate structure. For example, separate returns 
may be advantageous when one spouse's unreimbursed medical 
expenses exceed 7.5% of that spouse's adjusted gross income but fall 
short of7.5% ofthe couple's combined adjusted gross income. Filing 
separately, in such an instance, would permit a deduction to the 
spouse with medical expenses, while filing jointly would preclude that 
deduction?8 Thus, in rare instances, a benefit from filing separately 
may exceed the normal rate-structure advantages of joint filing. In 
such cases, a married couple should file separately. Nonetheless, 
most ma.rried couples find it more desirable to file jointly because the 
overpowering incentive built into the rate structure to employ the joint 
return nearly always outweighs any advantages of separate returns.29 
An analysis of the bills recommending marriage penalty relief 
27 In 1993, an estimated 95.2% of all returns filed by married taxpayers were 
joint returns, and an estimated 97.5% of all married couples filed jointly. These estimates 
were derived from IRS statistics on the number of joint returns filed and the number of 
separate returns filed. In 1993, 48,298,687 joint returns were submitted to the IRS. See 
I.R.S., Pub. 1304, STATISTICS OF INCOME- 1993 INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS, 35 
tbl.l.3 (1996). Only 2,437,311 separate returns were filed by married taxpayers. See id 
Consequently, the total number of returns filed by married taxpayers can be estimated to 
be 50,735,998. Of these, 48,298,687 or 95.2% were joint returns. When one spouse files 
separately, the other may also file separately or not at all depending on whether that other 
spouse has sufficient income to trigger the filing requirement. An estimate of the number 
of such couples would be half the number of separate returns filed in 1993 or half of 
2,43 7 ,311. This is not a precise estimate, however, because undoubtedly some spouses of 
separate filers did not have to file at all on their own behalf. Assuming I ,218,656 couples 
fih;d separately, the total number of married couples who filed returns would amount to 
49,517,343 and the percentage of couples who chose to file jointly could be estimated as 
48,298,687 divided by the total number of couples who filed, or 49,517,343. In this 
manner, the percentage of couples who filed jointly could be estimated at 97.5%. 
28 See I.R.C. § 213(a) (1999) (permitting a deduction for nonreimbursed 
medical expenses but only to the extent they exceed 7.5% of AGI). Separate returns have 
also been advantageous at times with regard to the limit on the capital loss deduction, the 
matching of long-term and short-term capital gains and losses, and the allocation of 
deductions between spouses that is available under separate returns. See Fred F. Murray, 
Problems ofT axation of the Income of Spouses in the Context of Divorce and Separation, 
COMMUNITY PROP. J ., 20, 57 ( 1987); see also Christian, supra note 6, at 271-72. 
29 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
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demonstrates that those proposals affect the current incentive to file 
jointly rather than separately. Indeed, almost all recently proposed 
legislation would intensify the incentive to file jointly.30 Under these 
approaches, an even greater percentage of married couples than under 
current law would file jointly rather than separately. As a result, most 
proposals aimed at reducing the marriage penalty would subject even 
more couples to the regime of joint and severalliability.31 
B. Joint and Several Liability, the Legal Consequence of the Joint 
Return 
As noted above, the effect of a legislative proposal on the 
choice of filing status is an important issue because significant legal 
consequences flow from the decision whether to file jointly or 
separately. One enormous, but rarely discussed, consequence 
involves the rule of joint and several liability. When a couple files 
jointly, it is treated as consenting, whether or not the spouses realize 
it, to joint and severalliability?2 Under that liability system, the IRS 
can collect a tax deficiency from one spouse even if it was generated 
by the other spouse's unreported income or improper deduction. The 
government need not seek payment from the spouse who created the 
deficiency but, instead, may look to the non-delinquent spouse to 
satisfy the deficiency even if that spouse neither knew of, nor 
benefited from, the tax underpayment.33 
30 See infra notes 44-126, 136-49 and accompanying text. 
. 
31 In one proposal, however, the incentive to file jointly is diminished for 
some couples. See infra notes 127-35 and accompanying text. Under that sole approach, 
some couples would find it more valuable to file separately than jointly. For couples" in 
that group, fewer would eventually find themselves exposed to joint and several liability. 
32 See Revenue Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 554, ch. 289, § Sl(b), 52 Stat. 447, 
476 (1938); see also I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (1999). 
33 See generally Beck, supra note 22, at 328-29; Christian, Liability, supra 
note 22, at 535. An "innocent spouse" exception to joint and several liability exists 
whereby a spouse may sometimes be able to escape the pernicious effects of joint and 
several liability. See I.R.C. § 6015 (1999). This exception to joint and several liability, 
however, is narrowly tailored and in many respects inadequate. For an excellent 
discussion of the innocent-spouse rule of I.R.C. § 6015 and its shortcomings, see 
generally Toni Robinson & Mary Ferrari, The New Innocent Spouse Provision: 'Reason 
and Law Walking Hand in Hand? ', 80 TAX NOTES 835, 843-49 (1998). 
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Joint and several liability is problematic for a variety of 
reasons. First, it works an obvious injustice by obligating one person 
to satisfy the tax liability of another, according minimal regard to the 
ability of, or to the propriety of having, the non-delinquent spouse 
pay.34 Second, it tends, in operation, to disadvantage women much 
more than men. That is, it has been shown to operate more frequently 
and more onerously against women than against men, both as applied 
and in its very structure. Professor Richard Beck, for example, has 
demonstrated that joint and several liability, as applied, has been used 
to collect husbands' deficiencies from wives and ex-wives much more 
frequently than it has been commissioned in collecting wives' tax 
liabilities from husbands or ex-husbands.35 A variety of social and 
economic factors operating in the United States contribute to this 
pattem.36 Furthermore, as applied, joint and several liability is not 
34 See, e.g., Christian, Liability, supra note 22, at 536, 592-93. 
35 See Beck, supra note 22, at 320 & n.4, 327-28 n.34 (estimating that 
approximately 90% of the collections from the spouse who did not generate the 
deficiency penalized women and that only 10% penalized men). See also Richard C.E. 
Beck, The Innocent Spouse Rules, 15 FAM. Anvoc., 30 ( 1992); Jerome Borison, Alice 
Through a Very Dark and Confusing Looking Glass: Getting Equity from the Tax Court 
in Innocent Spouse Cases, 30 F AM. L.Q. 123, 125 (1996); Christian, Liability, supra note 
22, at 593-98; H.J. Cummins, Catch /040: Joint Returns Mean Joint Liability - And In 
Some Cases, That Means Trouble, NEWSDAY, Jan. 30, 1994, available at 1994 WL 
7442627 (claiming 95% of joint liability cases involve wives seeking relief from their 
husbands' or ex-husbands' tax liabilities); Stephen A. Zorn, Innocent Spouses, 
Reasonable Women and Divorce: The Gap Between Reality and the Internal Revenue 
Code, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 421, 424-25 (1996) (noting in 90% of innocent spouse 
cases the spouse seeking relief from joint and several liability is the wife or ex-wife); Lisa 
K. Edison-Smith, Comment, "If You Love Me, You 'II Sign My Tax Return": Spousal Joint 
and Several Liability for Federal Income Taxes and the "Innocent Spouse" Exception, 18 
HAMLINE L. REv. 102, 119, 123-24 (1994) (noting in over 90% of the cases from 1971 
through 1990 in which taxpayers sought relief from joint and several liability, the 
taxpayer was a wife or ex-wife rather than a husband or ex-husband). 
36 Those factors include, first, men are more likely than women to be self-
employed, and thus, men are more able to conceal income or invent deductions than 
women. See Beck, supra note 22, at 320 n.4, 376-77; Michael C. Durst, ABA Section of 
Tax'n & Am. Bar Found., Report of the Second Invitational Conference on Income Tax 
Compliance ( 1988), reprinted in 42 TAX LAW. 705, 716-21 ( 1989) ("Compliance rates 
among the self-employed ... are far lower" than compliance rates for wages, salaries, 
interest, dividends, and capital gains.). Second, men tend to take more aggressive 
reporting positions than women, thereby, generating more tax deficiencies. See Karyl A. 
Kinsey, Survey Data on Tax Compliance: A Compendium and Review, in AMERICAN BAR 
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only more likely to cause wives to pay their husbands' deficiencies 
more frequently than the reverse, but it is also more likely to shift 
heavy burdens from husbands to wives while shifting relatively light 
burdens from wives to their husbands.37 Thus, the rule of joint and 
several liability operates more onerously against women than men. 
Joint and several liability penalizes women more than men not · 
merely as applied in the social context, but also systemically.38 The 
tax code, itself, is internally biased against women: two or more 
features of the code interact in a manner that predictably harms wives 
more severely, or more often, than their husbands. The incentive in 
the rate structure for couples to file jointly rather than separately39 
interacts with the rule of joint and several liability40 to create one such 
example of systemic bias. As noted above, the incentive to file jointly 
is· strongest for couples in which spouses' incomes differ; the more 
they differ, the greater the incentive to use the joint retum.41 Because 
FOUNDATION TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE PROJECT WORKING PAPER 8716, at 29 (1987) 
(suggesting men, psychologically, are more likely to take aggressive reporting positions 
than women and that, in fact, they do so); Beck, supra note 22, at 376. Third, women are 
less likely than men to be self-employed, so women who work in the paid work force are 
more likely than men to have wages or salaries that the IRS can easily garnish. See Beck, 
supra note 22, at 320, 377. And fourth, wives are more likely than husbands to remain in 
the marital home upon separation or divorce and thus tend to be easier for the IRS to 
locate than are their ex-husbands. See Cummins, supra note 35; Edison-Smith, supra 
note 35, at 123; H.J. Cummins, Paying for the Sins of a Spouse, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, 
Feb. 14, 1994, at DIO; Borison, supra note 35, at 125-26; cf Ken Rankin, A/CPA Advises 
IRS on Fairer Divorce Procedures, 10 ACCT. TODAY, July 29, 1996, at 8, available in 
1996 WL 8970070 (noting collection efforts often proceed against the wife because she 
commonly remains in the collection region in which the return was originally filed and 
because the husband is more likely to move to a different IRS region). 
37 See Christian, Liability, supra note 22, at 595. "Because wives have lower 
average earnings than husbands, the joint return deficiencies caused by the husband are 
likely to be greater than those caused by the wife." /d. at 595-97. See also Beck, supra 
note 22, at 320 n.4. · 
38 For a description of three manners in which joint and several liability 
interacts with other aspects of the tax code to create systemic bias against women, see 
Christian, Liability, supra note 22, at 536-37, 598-615. 
39 See supra notes 22-31 and accompanying text. Compare I.R.C. § l(a) 
(1999) with I.R.C. § l(d) (1999). 
40 See I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (1999). 
41 In general, this pattern would remain true under the legislative proposals 
for marriage penalty relief. See infra Part III. 
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joint and several liability applies only when couples file jointly, and 
because the incentive to file jointly is strongest for couples in which 
spouses' incomes differ, the tax code is designed to cause joint and 
several liability to apply with the greatest frequency when one spouse, 
usually the husband, earns significantly more than the other, usually 
the wife.42 This situation of unequal resources is precisely when it is 
least fair to impose joint and several liability. 
Joint and several liability is objectionable for a variety of 
reasons. It shifts liability from one taxpayer to another, despite 
potentially extreme financial hardship. The rationales used to justify 
the rule do not, in fact, persuade.43 More alarmingly, joint and several 
liability functions in the social setting to harm women more often and 
more acutely than men, interacting systemically with other elements 
of the joint return system to create a variety of unjust burdens - all 
falling primarily on women. Any change in the law that would cause 
joint and several liability to apply to even more couples than it does 
currently would be ill-advised, inequitable, and imprudent, even if the 
reform is intended merely to ameliorate the marriage penalty. 
III. SOURCES OF THE MARRIAGE PENALTY AND LEGISLATIVE 
APPROACHES TO CHANGE 
The following sections of this article identify various causes 
of the marriage penalty and then analyze related relief proposals with 
respect to their impact on a couple'schoice of filing status. Virtually 
none of these measures would alleviate the problem of joint and 
several liability. In fact, most proposals for marriage penalty relief 
would heighten the problem of joint and several liability by making 
the joint return even more attractive than it already is .. Consequently, 
joint and several liability would be visited on even more couples than 
under current law since more would file jointly. 
42 See Christian, Liability, supra note 22, at 604-09. 
43 See generally Christian, Liability, supra note 22. 
HeinOnline -- 16 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 314 1999-2000
314 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XVI 
A. The Earned Income Tax Credit 
The Earned Income Tax Credit ("EITC")44 is one program in 
the tax code that tias attracted criticism for penalizing marriage 
significantly among the working poor.45 Suggesting that the EITC, in 
fact, discourages marriage or encourages divorce would be speculative 
because it is unknown to what extent the economic effects translate 
into behavior. Social phenomena, including lack of understanding of 
the provisions' effects among those subject to it, could offset any 
actual behavioral response to this marriage penalty .46 
Unfortunately, proposals aimed at ameliorating the EITC 
marriage penalty fail to reduce the incidence of joint returns among 
married couples. Thus, as explained below, these proposals do 
nothing to minimize the impact of joint and several liability on the 
nation's working poor. 
Although the EITC is available to both single and married 
taxpayers, a marriage penalty results from the fact that the credit's 
phaseout levels are the same for all taxpayers, regardless of marital 
status.47 Thus, two individuals who are single and earn less than the 
44 l.R.C. § 32 ( 1999). 
45 See, e.g., Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the 
Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533, 559-64 (1995); 
Dorothy A. Brown, Race, Class, and Gender Essentialism in Tax Literature: The Joint 
Return, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1469, 1479-81 (1997); McCaffery; supra note 3, at 995-
96. 
46 See, e.g., Alstott, supra note 45, at 559-60; Michael J. Caballero, The 
Earned Income Tax Credit: The Poverty Program That Is Too Popular, 48 TAX LAW. 
435, 460 ( 1995) (suggesting the EITC marriage penalty may not affect major life 
decisions such as marriage or divorce despite its presence in the code). 
47 See Alstott, supra note 45, at 562. The following example illustrates the 
EITC marriage penalty: 
The EITC is available to both single-parent and married-couple 
families, but the amount of the credit is the same for single 
parents and for married couples that have the same income and 
number of children. Thus, a married couple earning $28,000 
receives no EITC, but two single people, each earning $14,000, 
may each receive a substantial EITC. As a consequence, the 
EITC can impose huge marriage penalties, particularly relative to 
income. 
/d. (internal citations omitted). See also Brown, supra note 45, at 1480-81; Caballero, 
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phaseout amount would each be fully eligible for the EITC. If they 
marry, however, their incomes will be combined for purposes of 
computing the credit. This combined income may push them into or 
above the phaseout level, thus reducing the amount of the credit for 
which they would be eligible or perhaps eliminating their credit 
altogether.48 Proposals aimed at reducing the EITC marriage penalty 
generally seek to do so by directly or indirectly increasing the 
phaseout levels only for married couples, thus, permitting them to 
retain more of the EITC despite the aggregation of spousal incomes.49 
supra note 46, at 460 (providing example illustrating the EITC marriage penalty); Carlyn 
S. McCaffrey & Elyse G. Kirschner, Family Tax Planning Under the New Law, 16 FAM. 
Aovoc. 10, 68 (1994). 
48 See McCaffrey & Kirschner, supra note 47, at 68 (providing illustration of 
how the phaseout provisions cause a marriage penalty). 
49 See Taxpayer Refund Act of 1999 (Engrossed Senate Amendment), H.R. 
2488, 106th Cong. § 202 (1999) ("Paragraph (2) of section 32(b) (relating to percentages 
and amounts) is amended - (1) by striking 'AMOUNTS. - The earned' and inserting 
'AMOUNTS.- (A) IN GENERAL.- Subject to subparagraph (B), the earned,' and (2) by 
adding at the end the following new subparagraph: '(B) JOINT RETURNS.- In the case of a 
joint return, the phaseout amount determined under subparagraph (A) shall be increased 
by $2,000. "'); Taxpayer Refund Act of 1999, S. 1429, I 06th Con g. § 202(a) ( 1999) 
("Paragraph (2) of section 32(b) (relating to percentages and amounts) is amended- ... 
(2) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: '(B) JOINT RETURNS.- In the 
case of a joint return, the phaseout amount determined under subparagraph (A) shall be 
increased by $2,000'.") (direct increase in phaseout levels); Marriage Tax Penalty Relief 
Act of 1999, H.R. 1453, 106th Cong. §2(c) (1999) ("Earned Income Credit Phaseout to 
Reflect Deduction. - Paragraph (2) of section 32(c) of such Code (defining earned 
income) is amended by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: '(C) 
MARRIAGE PENALTY REDUCTION.- Solely for purposes of applying subsection (a)(2)(B) 
[relating to the phaseout rules], earned income for any taxable year shall be reduced by an 
amount equal to the amount of the deduction allowed to the taxpayer for such taxable year 
under section 222 [relating to the two-earner deduction]'." The reduction in the amount 
treated as earned income for purposes of the EITC phaseout allows married couples, in 
effect, a more favorable phaseout schedule than they would otherwise enjoy.) (indirect 
increase in phaseout levels); Income Security Enhancement Act of 1999, S. 8, 106th 
Cong. § 202(c) (1999) (same in essence as H.R. 1453, 106th Cong., supra) (indirect 
increase in phaseout levels); S. 2147, 105th Cong. § 1(c) (1998) (same in essence as H.R. 
1453, 106th Cong., supra) (indirect increase in phaseout levels); H.R. 3995, 105th Cong. 
§ I (a) (1998) ("Paragraph (2) of Section 32(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 
(relating to phaseout amount) is amended by adding at the end the following flush 
sentence: 'In the case of a joint return for a taxable year beginning after December 31, 
1998, the preceding table shall be applied by substituting '$16,020' for '$11 ,61 0' each 
place it appears'.") (direct increase in phaseout levels); Universal Tobacco Settlement 
Act, S. 1415, 105th Cong. (1997), Amendment No. 2686 to Amendment No. 2437 offered 
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These proposals are problematic from the perspective of 
choice of filing status because none changes the current threshold 
requirement that to be eligible for the EITC, married taxpayers must 
file jointly.50 The EITC is completely unavailable to married couples 
who file separate returns. None of the recent marriage penalty relief 
proposals that address the EITC have repealed the requirement that a 
married couple must file jointly. Thus, despite proposals to improve 
the EITC, that credit would remain a code provision that makes joint 
returns relatively appealing and separate returns relatively 
disadvantageous.51 This favoring of the joint return would plainly 
compound the incentive for married couples to file jointly, not 
separately.52 Consequently, under these proposals for marriage 
penalty relief, more married couples in the lower-income tax brackets 
would use joint returns to avail themselves of the credit, and thus, 
more would become jeopardized by the regime of joint and several 
liability. 
As I have noted elsewhere,53 the EITC's joint-return 
requirement is especially inappropriate because the low-bracket 
couples normally eligible for the credit54 do not experience any 
by Mr. Gramm on June 10, 1998, Section XX(c) ("EARNED INCOME CREDIT PHASEOUT TO 
REFLECT DEDUCTION.- Section 32( c)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (defining 
earned income) is amended by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: '(C) 
MARRIAGE PENALTY REDUCTION.- Solely for purposes of applying subsection (a)(2)(8) 
[relating to the phaseout rules], earned income for any taxable year shall be reduced by an 
amount equal to the amount of the deduction allowed to the taxpayer for such taxable year 
under section 222 [relating to a deduction for married taxpayers to reduce the marriage 
penalty]'." The reduction in the amount treated as earned income for purposes of the 
EITC phaseout allows married couples, in effect, a more favorable phaseout schedule.) 
(indirect increase in phaseout levels) and Amendment No. 2688 to Amendment No. 2437 
offered by Mr. Daschle on June 10, 1998, Section XX01(c) (same as "language in the 
Gramm amendment) (indirect increase in phaseout leveis). 
50 See I.R.C. § 32(d) (1999) (stating, "[i]n the case of an individual who is 
married (within the meaning of section 7703), this section [referring to l.R.C. § 32 which 
authorizes the credit] shall apply only if a joint return is filed for the taxable year under 
section 6013."). 
51 See Christian, supra note 2, at 171, 172. 
52 s "d ee 1 . 
53 See id., at 171, n.23. 
54 In general, a taxpayer must have low income to be eligible for the EITC. 
See l.R.C. § 32(a)(2) (1999) (limiting credit, phasing it out as incomes rise). 
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incentive from the rate structure to file jointly. Under normal 
circumstances, the low-bracket couple would not benefit from filing 
jointly because that couple generally falls in the lowest tax bracket 
where the privilege of income splitting is not found. . In general, 
income splitting does not afford such a couple any tax savings since 
all of its income is already in the lowest available tax bracket. 
Because income splitting does not assist such couples, that feature of 
joint rates does not encourage them to file jointly rather than 
separately. Absent the EITC-imposed requirement that these low-
income married couples file jointly, they would experience no 
incentive from the rate structure to do so. They could file separately, 
free from financial constraint. If it were not for the joint-return 
requirement in the EITC, such couples could avoid joint and several 
liability altogether. The EITC, however, provides an overpowering 
incentive for these low-income couples to file jointly and results not 
merely in a slight expansion in the incidence of couples vulnerable to 
joint and several liability, but in a large increase.55 
B. The Standard Deduction. 
The standard deduction is another element of the code that has 
long been criticized as penalizing marriage.56 In most cases, as 
described below, marriage penalty relief proposals promising to 
reform the standard deduction do nothing to discourage joint filing 
and, thus, do nothing to reduce the incidence of joint and several 
liability. In fact, some proposals eliminate the standard deduction 
marriage penalty by unnecessarily making joint returns more 
favorable compared to separate returns than they are under current 
law. Thus, some proposals for relief actually exacerbate the problem 
of joint and several liability by making it apply to even more couples 
than it does under current law. 
55 See Christian, supra note 2, at I7I, n.23. 
56 See, e.g., Forman, supra note II, at 8, IO; DavidS. Hulse, Alternatives for 
Eliminating the Marriage Penalty, 66 TAX NOTES 25I, 252 (1995); Susan Kalinka, Acts 
i 990, No. I 009: The Repeal of Provisions for Separation from Bed and Board increases 
The Federal income Tax Burden of Separated Spouses in Louisiana, 53 LA. L. REv. 597, 
652 (1993). 
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Marriage is punished under the current standard deduction in 
that the allowance amounts to only $5,000 for married couples 
whether the spouses file jointly or separately.57 By contrast, if a 
couple remains unmarried, its standard deduction consists of two 
$3,000 amounts, one for each individual.58 Upon marrying a couple's 
combined standard deduction goes from a beneficial $6,000 to a less 
generous $5,000. The loss of the differential $1,000, deduction results 
in an increase in tax liability- a marriage penalty. 
Over the years Congress has introduced many bills designed 
to end this particular marriage penalty, but none has yet been 
enacted.59 Most proposals dispose of this penalty by making the 
standard deduction for married taxpayers, whether they file jointly or 
separately, twice that of the unmarried individual's standard 
deduction.60 In this manner, spouses continue to enjoy the equivalent 
57 See I.R.C. § 63(c)(2)(A)&(D) (1999) (providing $5,000 standard deduction 
for a joint return and $2,500 standard deduction for each of the two separate returns a 
couple would submit if filing separately). 
58 See I.R.C. § 63(c)(2)(C) (1999) (providing $3,000 standard deduction in 
the case of an unmarried individual). 
59 See, e.g., Common Sense Family Tax Relief Act of 1999, H.R. 2646, 
106th Cong. § 101 (1999); Financial Freedom Act of 1999, H.R. 2488, 106th Cong. §Ill 
( 1999); Marriage Penalty Relief Act, H.R. I 08, 106th Cong. § 2 (1999); H.R. 3524, I 05th 
Cong. ( 1998); Taxpayer Relief and Protection Act of 1997, H.R. 2718, 105th Con g. § 3 
(1997). 
6
° For example, the Marriage Penalty Relief Act, H.R. 108, 106th Cong. § 2 
( 1999) makes the standard deduction marriage neutral through the following language: 
(a) IN GENERAL. - Paragraph (2) of section 63(C) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to standard deduction) is amended-
(I) by striking '$5,000' in subparagraph (A) and inserting 'twice 
the dollar amount in effect under subparagraph (C) for the taxable 
year'; 
(2) by adding 'or' at the end of subparagraph (B); 
(3) by striking 'in the case of and all that follows in subparagraph 
(C) and inserting 'in any other case.'; and 
(4) by striking subparagraph (D). 
!d. § 2(a). This proposed amendment would make the standard deduction marriage 
neutral by making the deduction applicable to joint filers twice as large as the standard 
deduction applicable to single filers. Compare H.R. 108, 106th Cqng. § 2(a)(l) with 
I.R.C. § 63(c)(2)(C)(I999). Furthermore, by striking everything after and including "in 
the case of' and substituting "in any other case," the proposal would make the standard 
deduction applicable to married separate filers identical .to the one for single taxpayers. 
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of both single standard deductions upon marrying. Furthermore, this 
approach to marriage penalty elimination makes no distinction in 
treatment between couples who file jointly and those who file 
separately. Under either filing status, the standard deduction amount 
is identical.61 This approach to marriage penalty relief, therefore, 
neither encourages nor discourages the use of joint returns, promoting 
neutrality between the two married filing statuses. 
Two recent proposals, however, eliminate the marriage 
penalty found in the standard deduction by creating a new set of 
standard deductions which favor the joint return over the separate 
return.62 In either case, when the proposed standard deductions are 
fully phased in, a joint return would yield a standard deduction equal 
in amount to twice· the standard deduction for single taxpayers.63 For 
Compare H.R. 108, 106th Cong. § 2(a)(3) & (4) with I.R.C. § 63(c)(2)(C) &(D) (1999). 
61 Separate filers would be entitled to two $3,000 standard deductions, and a 
jointly filing couple would be authorized to take one $6,000 standard deduction. See 
supra note 60. 
62 See Marriage Penalty Elimination Act of 1999, S. 284, 106th Cong., § 2 
(1999); Universal Tobacco Settlement Act, S. 1415, I 05th Cong. ( 1997) (Amendment 
No. 2686 to Amendment No. 2437 offered by Mr. Gramm on June 10, 1998, Section 
XX( a)). 
stating: 
63See S. 284, 106th Cong. § 2 (adding new paragraph (7) to I.R.C. § 63(c), 
(7) Elimination of Marriage Penalty for Joint Filers. - · 
(A) IN GENERAL. - In the case of a joint return or a surviving spouse 
... , the basic standard deduction under paragraph (2)(A) shall be 
increased by an amount equal to the applicable percentage [relating 
to the phase in of the increase] of the excess of-
(i) 200 percent of the basic standard deduction in 
effect for the taxable year under paragraph (2)(C), over 
(ii) the basic standard deduction in effect for the 
taxable year under paragraph (2)(A) (without regard to this 
paragraph).) 
See also S. 1415, 105th Cong. (Gramm Amendment) (adding new above-the-line 
deduction for use in addition to the joint return standard deduction and stating: 
SEC. 222. DEDUCTION FOR MARRIED COUPLES TO ELIMINATE THE MARRIAGE 
PENALTY. 
(a) IN GENERAL. -In the case of a joint return under section 6013 for 
the taxable year, there shall be allowed as a deduction an amount equal to the 
applicable percentage [relating to the phase in of the deduction] of the excess 
(if any) of-
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example, if the standard deduction for a single taxpayer is $3,000, as 
under current law,64 then under each proposal, a married couple filing 
jointly would be entitled to a standard deduction of $6,000.65 The 
marriage penalty would be eliminated for couples who file jointly.66 
Although the proposals increase the standard deduction for 
joint filers, they unfortunately make rio corresponding upward 
adjustment to the standard deduction for separate filers. Unqer the 
current code provision, that deduction amounts to only $2,500 per 
spouse,67 and it would remain so under the proposed reforms. Thus, 
while the provisions would introduce marriage neutrality into the 
standard deduction, they would also eliminate the neutrality that 
already exists between the joint and separate return. By increasing the 
joint return standard deduction to $6,000 while preserving the $2,500 
per person (or $5,000 per couple) separate return standard deduction, 
an additional incentive would arise for couples to file jointly. More 
couples than under current law would do so and would be subject to 
64 
(I) the sum of the amounts determined under subparagraphs (B) 
and (C) of section 63(c)(2) for such taxable year (relating to the 
basic standard deduction for a head of a household and a single 
individual, respectively), over 
(2) the amount determined under section 63(c)(2)(A) for such 
taxable year (relating to the basic standard deduction for a joint 
return)). 
See I.R.C. § 63(c)(2)(C) (1999). 
65 Under S. 284, 106th Cong. § 2(a), the standard $5,000 deduction currently 
available to a joint filer under I.R.C. § 63(c)(2)(A) would be increased by twice the single 
standard deduction, $6,000 and then reduced by the standard deduction otherwise 
available to a joint filer, $5,000. See id. That is, the joint filer's $5,000 standard 
deduction would be increased by $1,000 and would amount to $6,000, or twice the 
standard deduction available to single taxpayers. 
Under the Gramm Amendment to S. 1415, 105th Cong., couples filing jointly 
would be entitled to a deduction in addition to the $5,000 joint return standard deduction. 
That additional deduction would amount to the excess of two unmarried person's standard 
deductions, or $6,000, over the $5,000 joint return standard deduction. Thus, married 
couples filing jointly would be entitled to an extra deduction of $1,000. When added to 
the $5,000 joint return standard deduction, the proposal would afford these couples a total 
deduction of$6,000, or twice the standard deduction available to single taxpayers. See id. 
66 Two single individuals would each receive a $3,000 standard deduction, 
totaling $6,000. Upon marrying, they could file jointly and would be entitled to a $6,000 
deduction. See supra note 65. 
67 See I.R.C. § 63(c)(2)(D) (1999). 
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joint and several liability. 
In an effort to achieve marriage neutrality, the. proposals 
described above introduce an additional incentive into the code for 
married couples to choose joint returns over separate ones. The 
proposals could easily avoid such an incentive simply by adjusting the 
separate return standard deduction upward as well, so that two 
separate return standard deductions would also amount to $6,000. 
The bills, however, fail to increase the separate· return standard 
deduction. As currently drafted, these measures would motivate more. 
couples to file jointly, and thus, exacerbate the problem of joint and 
several liability by causing it to apply to more couples. 
C. The Rate Structure Marriage Penalty: A Marriage Penalty for Two-
Earner Couples and a Marriage Bonus for Single-Earner Couples 
The most widely known marriage penalty and marriage bonus 
in the tax system results from the structure of tax rates.68 "The rates 
for couples who file joint returns and the rates that apply to single 
[individuals] ... relate to each other so that some couples- those in 
which [the] spouses' incomes are similar- experience a marriage 
penalty."69 These individuals' combined tax liability increases when 
they marry. "At the same time, however, other couples - those in 
which the spouses' incomes differ- [enjoy] ... a marriage bonus."70 
The tax bills of these individuals decline when they marry. 
Understanding how the rate structure currently gives rise to 
marriage penalties and marriage bonuses requires an appreciation, 
first, of income splitting and aggregation and, second, of the rates that 
apply to single individuals. Income splitting and aggregation will be . 
described first. 
Income splitting and aggregation are the mechanisms by 
which joint rates may be derived from separate return rates.71 As 
noted above, when two spouses file a joint return, they report their 
68 See, e.g., Christian, supra note 6, at 272-73 & n.ll8. 
69 Christian, supra note 2, at 172; see also Brown, supra note I 0, at 49-52. 
7° Christian, supra note 2, at 172; see also Brown, supra note I 0, at 49~52. 
71 . 
. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
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combined incomes.72 This practice is required by the tax code73 and is 
known as income aggregation because the spouses must aggregate 
their net incomes before applying the progressive tax rates to compute 
tax liability. The tax law then assumes that each spouse earned half of 
the combined income. This assumption is known as income splitting. 
Income splitting has been a feature of the joint return rates since 
194874 when, for the first time, Congress required joint tax rates to 
rise half as quickly as the rates for married couples who filed 
separately. Congress achieved this mandate by making the joint tax 
brackets twice as wide as the brackets for married couples who filed 
separately.75 
As previously noted, income splitting and aggregation are the 
two mechanisms by which joint return liabilities may be computed 
using separate return rates. A married couple's joint tax liability may 
be arrived at indirectly by treating the couple as if each spouse had 
earned half of the combined income, by applying separate return rates 
to those incomes, and then by adding the two separate return liabilities 
together.76 
Consider the following hypothetical example. A couple exists 
in which the husband earns $80,000 and the wife earns $40,000. If 
the spouses file jointly, their gross income will be listed on the joint 
return as $120,000, but each will be treated, using separate return 
rates, as if he or she earned half of that total, or $60,000. Essentially, 
the joint rates operate as if each spouse earned $60,000, taxed under 
separate rates, rather than the husband earning $80,000 and the wife 
earning $40,000. For tax computation purposes, the joint return rates, 
through income splitting, treat $20,000 worth of income as having 
72 See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
73 See I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (1999) ("[!)fa joint return is made, the tax shall be 
computed on the aggregate income."). 
74 See Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 471, § 301, 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. (62 
Stat. 110, 114) 85, 92-93. 
75 Compare the brackets contained in I.R.C. § !(a) (1999) (t~ brackets for 
married taxpayers filing jointly) with those of I.R.C. § !(d) (1999) (tax brackets for 
married taxpayers filing separately). See also Christian, Complicity, supra note 22, at 
445. 
76 See Christian, Complicity, supra note 22; supra note 23 and accompanying 
text. 
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been shifted from the husband to the wife. The husband actually 
earned $80,000, but the joint rates treat him as having earned $60,000, 
while the wife actually earned $40,000, but is treated as having earned 
$60,000. In essence, the joint return rates cause $20,000 to be 
"shifted" from the husband to the wife. This shifting of income 
effects a tax savings for the couple because $20,000 of income is 
essentially shifted from the husband's higher separate rate tax bracket 
into the wife's lower separate rate tax bracket. Income splitting under 
the joint return confers a tax savings whenever spouses' incomes 
differ. Under income splitting, any married couple earning the same 
total income as this couple, $120,000, would have the same joint 
return liability, regardless of the distribution of incomes between the 
spouses. This happens because in all cases, the joint tax rates will 
treat each spouse as if he or she earned half of the combined $120,000 
of income, or $60,000.77 
By contrast, ifthese hypothetical spouses filed separately, they 
would not receive the benefit of income splitting.78 The husband 
would be taxed under separate rates on $80,000, not $60,000, and the 
wife would be taxed under separate rates on $40,000, not $60,000. 
Upon filing separately, the couple would not be able to shift $20,000 
from the husband's higher separate return rate bracket into the wife's 
lower tax bracket and would not be able to effect a tax savings 
because the couple would forego the joint return benefit of income 
splitting. The sum of their separate return liabilities would exceed the 
liability that would have resulted from filing jointly. 
The phenomenon of income splitting most benefits those 
couples whose incomes most differ. The more incomes differ, the 
greater the benefit from income splitting and filing jointly. Thus, a 
couple in which spouses' incomes are disparate, like the one described 
above, obtains a large tax savings from income splitting because a 
significant amount of income is treated as shifted from the higher 
bracket to the lower bracket. By contrast, the more similar the 
spouses' incomes, the smaller the benefit from income splitting. 
77 See Christian, supra note 6. Thus, joint returns would generate identical 
liabilities for four couples in which incomes were, respectively: $120,000/$0; 
$100,000/$20,000; $80,000/$40,000; and $60,000/$60,000. 
78 See Christian, supra note 6, at 260. 
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Income splitting operates in those cases to shift ·smaller amounts of 
incorre from the higher-earning spouse to the lower earner, thus 
effecting a small"er tax sa~ings. Spouses with equal incomes get no 
benefit whatsoever from income splitting. They m·~y not shift income 
from one spouse's higher bracket into the other's lower bracket 
because the incomes are already equal, and the two spouses, therefore, 
already fall in the same tax brackets. As a consequence, filing jointly 
provides no tax savings relative to separate filing when spouses' 
incomes are equal. 
The above patterns are easily conveyed when represented 
pictorially. Graph I, below, depicts the pattern of joint return and 
combined separate return tax liabilities for various_ couples for whoin 
combined income is the same, say $120,000, but for . whom the 
distribution of earnings between the two spouses varies. The levels 
indicated on ·the left side of. the graph represent the joint versus 
separate liabilities a couple would: face if one spouse earned 
significantly more than the other, for instance, $120,000 in earnings of 
one spouse and no earnings by the other spouse. As one moves across 
the graph to the right, the distribution of earnings between the two 
spouses becomes more and more equal. Thus, the joint return and 
separate return liabilities represented in the middle of the graph could 
be those of a couple in which one spouse earns $80,000 while the 
other. earns $40,000. The joint return and separate return liabilities 
represented on the right side of the graph are those for a couple with 
the same total income, $120,000, but where the two spouses' earnings 
are exactly equal, or $60,000 each. 
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Graph 1. 
DI EI 
Note that for the disparate-income couple, the joint return 
liability is much lower than the separate return liability. This tax 
savings from filing jointly is a consequence of the income splitting 
described above that is available to joint filers. 79 Also notice that 
regardless of the distribution of income between the two spouses, the 
joint return liability is the same for all couples because their combined 
income is the same for each couple, $120,000.80 
Another important observation from the chart is that as· 
spousal incomes converge, i.e., as one moves across the chart to the 
right, the benefit from income splitting becomes smaller and smaller,81 
and the joint return and separate return liabilities thus move closer 
together. Because the benefit of income splitting diminishes as 
spouses' incomes converge, joint filing conveys a smaller and smaller 
benefit relative to separate filing as one moves across the chart to the 
right. This phenomenon appears pictorially in the form of the 
79 See supra notes 76-78, and accompanying text. 
80 See supra notes 6 and 77 and accompanying text. 
81 See supra notes 76-78, and accompanying text. 
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downward slope ofthe separate liability line as it moves towards, and 
finally meets, the joint liability line where spouses' incomes equal 
each other.82 Joint and separate return liabilities finally equal each 
other when the two spouses' incomes become exactly equal.83 An 
equal-income couple, where both spouses earn $60,000 for example, 
would incur the same tax liability by filing separately as by .filing 
jointly because income splitting would not have provided any benefit 
to such a couple. 
Graph 1, above, illustrates the joint and separate return 
liabilities that a married couple would face at a given level of 
combined taxable income. It represents the structure of joint rates 
relative to separate return rates for married individuals. The manner 
in which this rate structure gives rise to the marriage penalty and 
marriage bonus becomes apparent when one considers the rates that 
are imposed on unmarried individuals. 
I have previously described the relationship between rates 
applying to single taxpayers and those that apply to married couples: 
[As currently formulated, the marriage penalty and 
bonus that result from the rate structure] arose in 1969. 
In that year, Congress lowered the tax rates applicable 
to unmarried individuals in response to single 
taxpayers' complaints that the 1948 adoption of 
income splitting only for married taxpayers had shifted 
the income tax burden disproportionately to unmarried 
individuals. Previously, [unmarried rates were equal 
to the rates that applied to separately filing married 
individuals] . · .. : Consequently, prior to 1969, a 
couple in which a man and woman earned equal 
incomes would generate the same total tax liability, 
whether the taxpayers were single or whether they 
filed jointly as a married couple. The 1969 reduction 
in individual rates for single taxpayers without a 
concomitant reduction in joint tax rates thereby gave 
82 The downward slope in the couple's separate return liability line results 
from the absence of income splitting in separate return rates. Compare separate return 
liability line with notes 6 and 77, supra, and accompanying text. 
83 See supra notes 76-78, and accompanying text. 
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rise to the possibility of a marriage penalty. 84 
Consider an unmarried couple in which two individuals earn 
the same combined income, $120,000, as .the hypothetical married 
couple described above. The 1969 reduction in individual rates for 
single taxpayers caused singles' tax rates to fit, as shown below, 




The broken line represents the sum of the tax liabilities of two 
unmarried individuals whose combined income is the same as that of 
the married couple, $120,000. Thus, an unmarried couple in which 
one individual earns more than the other, one earns $120,000 while 
the other has no income, for example, would generate a higher 
combined tax liability than would two single individuals of equal 
earning capacity, say $60,000 each.85 
Focusing first on equal-income couples on the right side of the 
diagram, Graph 2 shows that two single taxpayers with equal incomes 
would each enjoy the post-1969 low single rates. Upon marrying, 
84 Christian, supra note 6, at 276-77 (citations omitted). 
85 This downward slope in the unmarried couple's liability results from the 
absence of income splitting in single rates. See supra note 82. 
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however, the higher rates would apply. For spouses who earned 
similar incomes, income splitting under the joint return would provide 
little or no benefit relative to the separate return. Thus, for those 
couples income splitting under the joint return would provide a 
smaller benefit than the tax cut Congress provided to singles in 1969. 
For individuals earning similar incomes, the tax benefits of being 
single outweigh the income splitting-benefit from· filing jointly as a 
married person. After 1969, similar-income couples, thus, begin to 
experience a marriage penalty as a result of the tax rates.86 The closer 
the spouses' incomes are to each other, the greater is the penalty. 
The 1969 reduction in rates for single taxpayers was 
not so large, however, that it made taxpayers better off 
single than married in all cases. [Moving to the left 
side of the diagram, above,] [t]or married couples with 
disparate incomes, [those] who could benefit [greatly] 
from income splitting ... , the reduction in taxes from 
filing jointly rather than separately could still exceed 
the reduction Congress had conferred on single 
taxpayers in 1969. Consequently, some couples could 
obtain a larger tax reduction by marrying and by filing 
jointly than they could under the rate reduction for 
singles in 1969. Those couples experience a marriage 
benefit rather than a marriage penalty [as a result of 
the rate structure]. 87 
The disparate-income couple obtains significant benefit by 
marrying and filing jointly rather than remaining single. Such a 
couple derives more benefit from income splitting than from the 1969 
tax cut for singles. For these disparate-income couples, the rate 
structure creates a marriage bonus. 88 The greater the disparity in 
spouses' incomes, the greater the marriage bonus. 
86 That is, for similar-income couples, joint return liabilities exceed 
combined single liabilities. 
87 Christian, supra note 6, at 277 (citations omitted). 
88 That is, joint return liability for disparate-income couples is less than 
combined single liabilities. 
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1. Proposals offering relief through a rough and indirect offset to the 
rate structure: the two-earner deduction or credit 
Many recent proposals in Congress attempt to address the 
marriage pena.lty that arises from the rate structure - the penalty that 
is imposed primarily on similar-income couples. These proposals take 
a variety of approaches. One method indirectly addresses the lack of 
marriage neutrality in the rate structure, not by altering that rate 
structure, but by proposing a cleduction or credit for two-earner 
couples.89 The purpose of such a deduction or credit is to allow an 
approximate offset to the financial harm that the rate structure 
marriage penalty may impose. The deductions or credits are generally 
available only to two-earner couples, those in which both spouses 
participate in the paid work force. This requirement is an attempt to 
funnel marriage penalty relief only to those who are penalized, 
similar-income couples. Of course, these legislative approaches do 
not eliminate marriage bonuses enjoyed by disparate-income couples. 
Unfortunately, these proposals would each increase the 
incidence of joint and several liability: these proposals are 
problematic from the perspective of choice of filing status because in 
each case, the availability of the tax preference is conditioned on 
using a joint return.90 The deduction or credit to offset the marriage 
89 See Marriage Tax Penalty Relief Act of 1999, H.R. 1453, 106th Cong. § 2 
( 1999) (proposing a two-earner deduction); Income Security Enhancement Act of 1999, 
S. 8, 106th Cong. § 202 (1999) (proposing a two-earner deduction); S. 2147, 105th Cong. · 
§ I (1998) (proposing a two-earner deduction); Universal Tobacco Settlement Act, S. 
1415, 105th Cong. (1997) (Amendment No. 2688 to Amendment No. 2437 offered by 
Mr. Daschle on June I 0, 1998, § XXO I (a)) (proposing a deduction for two-earner married 
couples); Marriage Penalty Relief Act, H.R. 2593, I 05th Cong. § 2 (1997) (proposing a 
deduction for two-earner married couples); Tax Freedom for Families Act of 1997, H.R. 
1584, I 05th Cong. § 202 ( 1997) (proposing a credit to reduce a couple's marriage 
penalty). 
90 See H.R. 1453, 106th Cong. § 2 (inserting new section "SEC. 222(a): 
DEDUCTION ALLOWED- In the case of a joint return for the taxable year, there shall be 
allowed as a deduction an amount ... "); S. 8, 106th Cong. § 202 (proposing new section 
"SEC. 222(a): IN GENERAL- In the case of a joint return under section 6013 for the 
taxable year, there shall be allowed as a deduction an amount ... "); S. 2147, 105th Cong. 
§I (inserting new section "SEC. 222(a): IN GENERAL- In the case of a joint return under 
section 6013 for the taxable year, there shall be allowed as a deduction an amount ... "); 
S. 1415, 105th Cong. (Daschle Amendment) (proposing new section "SEC. 222(a): IN 
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penalty would remain unavailable to any couple in which the spouses 
file separately. Paradoxically, spouses who file separately are in even 
more need of marriage penalty relief than are jointly filing couples, as 
can be ascertained from Graph 2, above. But this need is overlooked 
in the two-earner deduction and credit reform proposals. Because the 
relief proposals condition the two-earner deduction or credit on the 
use of a joint return, they directly exacerbate the incentive to file 
jointly rather than separately that already exists under current law.91 
Under any of these proposals, even more married couples would file 
jointly than currently do so, and thus, even more couples would find 
themselves subject to the regime of joint and several liability .92 . 
2. Proposals offering relief through a direct modification of the rate 
structure 
Most recent tax reform proposals attempt to provide marriage 
penalty relief by altering the rate structure directly. They attempt, in 
one manner or another, to redesign tax rates so as to reduce or 
eliminate the marriage penalty. Any change in the tax code that alters 
the rate structure necessarily changes the relative burdens of joint and 
separate returns and, thus, necessarily affects their incidence. 
Consequently, amending the rate structure potentially influences the 
number of couples to whom joint and several liability will apply. 
Unfortunately, virtually all ofthe proposals of this sort adjust rates in 
a way that retains the incentive to file jointly.93 In fact, many of the 
proposals increase the likelihood that a couple will file jointly and be 
subject to joint and several liability.94 One proposal, however, 
reduces the incentive to file jointly for some couples and will be 
GENERAL- In the case of a joint return under section 6013 for the taxable year, there shall 
be allowed as a deduction an amount ... "); H.R. 2593, 105th Cong. § 2 (inserting new 
section "SEC. 222(a): DEDUCTION ALLOWED- "In the case of a joint return for the 
taxable year, there shall be allowed as a deduction an amount ... "); H.R. 1584, 105th 
Cong. § 202 (proposing new section "SEC 24A(a): "ALLOWANCE OF CREDIT- In the case 
of a joint return for the taxable year, there shall be allowed as a credit ... "). 
91 See supra Part II.A. 
92 See I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (1999); see also Christian, supra note 2, at 56. 
93 See infra Parts IILC.2.d, III.C.2.f. 
94 See infra Parts III.C.2.a-c. 
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described below.95 
a) Approach I: Married couples may choose from among filing 
jointly, separately, or as if they were single 
One group of relief proposals endeavors to eradicate the 
marriage penalty by permitting married spouses to file jointly, 
separately, or, in effect, as if the spouses were single.96 The husband 
and wife may select whichever of the three sets of tax rates results in 
the lowest tax liability.97 In this manner, these proposals eliminate the 
marriage penalty found in the rate structure by permitting spouses to 
select single tax rates if those produce a better result than joint return 
rates. Under these proposals, however, marriage bonuses persist for 
disparate-income couples. Troublingly, these proposals would 
encourage more couples to file jointly and would subject more 
couples to joint and several liability than under current law. 
The single filing status option is achieved by offering married 
couples the new option of filing a "combined" return in which tax 
liability is computed, in effect, as ifthe two spouses were single.98 In 
each proposal, taxable income is allocated between the spouses in a 
manner that approximates their taxable incomes if they were single.99 
95 See infra Part lll.C.2.e. 
96 See Taxpayer Refund Act of 1999, S. 1429, I 06th Cong. § 20 I ( 1999); 
Half and Half: Tax Relief and Debt Reduction Act of 1998, S. 1711, 105th Cong. § 2 
(1998); Taxpayer Justice Act of 1997, H.R. 3059, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997); Marriage Tax 
Elimination Act, S. 1314, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997); Marriage Tax Elimination Act, H.R. 
2456, I 05th Cong. § 2 ( 1997); H.R. 2462, I 05th Cong. § 2 ( 1997). 
97 SeeS. 1429, 106th Cong. § 201; S. 1711, 105th Cong. § 2; H.R. 3059, 
105th Cong. § 2; S. 1314, 105th Cong. § 2; H.R. 2456, 105th Cong. § 2; H.R. 2462, 105th 
Cong. § 2 (proposing use of single-rate filing option and stating in proposed I.R.C. § 
6013A(a) "[a] husband and wife may make a combined return of income taxes under 
subtitle A under which - .... "). If adopted, new provision 6013A would thus offer a 
filing status option in addition to the joint return and the separate return available to 
married couples under current law. 
98 See supra note 97 (each bill proposing a new, combined return under 
proposed§ 6013A). 
99 See S. 1429, 106th Cong. § 201; S. 1711, 105th Cong. § 2; H.R. 3059, 
105th Cong, § 2; S. 1314, 105th Cong. § 2; H.R. 2456, 105th Cong. § 2; H.R. 2462, 105th 
Cong. § 2 (containing essentially the following proposed provisions: 
§ 6013A(a)(1): "[A] separate taxable income is determined for 
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Once these taxable incomes are determined for each spouse, . tax 
liability is computed in the combined return by applying single rates 
each spouse by applying the rules provided in this section ... " 
§ 6013A(b): 
Treatment of Income.- For purposes of this section-
(I) earned income (within the meaning of section 91l(d)), and any 
income received as a pension or annuity which. arises from an 
employer-employee relationship, shall be treated as the income of 
the spouse who rendered the services, and · · 
(2) income from property shall be divided between the spouses in 
accordance with their respective ownership rights in' s"uch property 
(equally in the case ofpr,operty heldjointly by the spouses) .. 
§ 6013A(c): 
Treatment of Deductions.- For purposes of this section 
(I) except as otherwise provided in this subsection, the deductions 
described in section 62(a) shall be allowed to the spouse treated as 
having the income to which such deductions relate, 
(2) the deduction for retirement savings described in paragraph (7) 
of section 62(a) shall be allowed to the spouse whose earned 
income qualified the savings for the deduction, 
(3) the deduction for alimony described in paragraph (10) of 
section 62(a) shall be allowed to the spouse who has the liability to 
pay the alimony, 
(4) the deduction described in paragraph (16) of section 62(a) 
(relating to contributions to medical savings accounts) shall be 
allowed to the spouse with respect to whose employment or self-
employment such account relates, 
(5) the deductions allowable by section ISI(b) (relating to personal 
exemptions. for taxpayer and spouse). shall be determined by 
allocating I personal exemption to each spouse, 
(6) section 63 shall be applied as if such spouses were not married, 
except that the election whether or not to itemize deductions shall 
be made jointly by both spouses and apply to each, and . 
(7) each spouse's share of all other deductions shall be determined 
by multiplying the aggregate amount thereof by the fraction -
(A) the numerator of which is such spouse's adjusted 
gross income, and · · 
(B) the denominator of· which is the combined 
adjusted gross incomes of the 2 spouses. · 
Any fraction determined under paragraph (7) shall be rounded to 
the nearest percentage point. 
§ 6013A(d): "Treatment of Credits - Credits shall be determined 
(and applied against the joint liability of the couple for tax determined under 
this section) as if the spouses had filed a joint return."). 
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to each separate taxable income, then by adding the two liabilities 
together. 100 
Under each of the proposals offering married couples the new 
unmarried rate filing option, the new, combined return is treated as a 
joint return and triggers joint and severalliability. 101 
Predicting the filing status a couple will elect under this 
proposed approach to marriage penalty relief requires an assumption 
that the couple will opt for the status that minimizes its combined tax 
liability. A reexamination of the pictorial representation of the 
competing tax liabilities aids in determining which one of the three 
filing statuses does so. The following graph illustrates the three 
statuses available to married taxpayers under this class of proposal. 
100 See S. 1429, 1 06th Cong. § 201; S. 1711, 105th Cong. § 2; H.R. 3059, 
105th Cong. §2; S. 1314, 105th Cong., § 2; H.R. 2456, 105th Cong. § 2; H.R. 2462, 105th 
Cong. § 2 (each containing the following proposed provision: § 6013A(a)(2): "[T]he tax 
imposed by section 1 is the aggregate amount resulting from applying the separate rates 
set forth in section 1(c) [relating to rates applicable to unmarried individuals] to each such 
taxable income."). 
101 See Taxpayer Refund Act of 1999, S. 1429, 106th Cong. § 201 (1999); 
Half and Half: Tax Relief and Debt Reduction Act of 1998, S. 1711, I 05th Cong. §2 
(1998); Taxpayer Justice Act of 1997, H.R. 3059, 105th Cong. §2 ( 1997); Marriage Tax 
Elimination Act, S. 1314, 105th Cong. §2 (1997); Mamiage Tax Elimination Act, H.R. 
2456, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997); H.R. 2462, 105th Cong. §2 (1997) (each containing the 
following proposed provision: "(e) Treatment as a Joint Return. - Except as otherwise 
provided in this section or in the regulations prescribed hereunder, for purposes of this 
title (other than sections 1 and 63( c)) a combined return under this section shall be treated 
as a joint return."). Thus, for purposes of I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3), the new, combined return 
would be treated as a joint return and would trigger joint and several liability. 
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Combined Return (using 
unmarried rates) 
The lowest combined tax liability for disparate-income 
couples continues to result from the traditional joint return. Thus, 
despite the ability to file as if the spouses were single, disparate-
income couples will opt instead to file jointly because at disparate 
incomes, the traditional joint return generates less tax than do single 
tax rates. These couples wiil continue to experience marriage bonuses 
as a result of the rate structure's operation. Once spouses' incomes 
converge enough to create a marriage penalty under the joint return, 
however, that is, once the combined return or unmarried couple's 
liability line dips below the joint return liability line toward the 
middle of Graph 3, married couples will. stop using the traditional 
joint return. Instead, they will switch to the new, combined return to 
obtain the benefit of the lower rates that apply to single individuals. 
To minimize their tax liabilities, similar-income and equal-income 
married couples are likely to choose the new, combined return that 
approximates being single, while disparate-income couples will 
continue to file the traditional joint return. This likely filing status 
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selection is represented on Graph 3 by the heavy line. 
The approach to marriage penalty relief that permits married 
couples to file as if they were single would, unfortunately, subject 
even more couples to the regime of joint and several liability. Under 
the proposals, disparate-income couples, as under current law, would 
continue to file the traditional joint return and remain subject to joint 
and several liability.102 More alarmingly, similar- and equal-income 
couples who currently find it advantageous at times to file separately 
due to tax rules outside of the rate structure103 would often have an 
incentive, because of a somewhat lower tax liability under the 
proposed law, to file the new, combined return as if they were single. 
Those couples would then become subject to joint and several 
liability. 104 Under the proposed legislation, couples in which spouses' 
earnings are close are even more likely than under current law to 
choose a filing status that imposes joint and several liability. The 
switch by such couples from separate returns to the new, combined 
return would deepen the ranks of married couples who are subject to 
the injurious joint and several liability regime. 
Another aspect of the bills employing this approach to 
marriage penalty relief compounds the favored status of the combined 
return. The standard deduction assigned to the combined return 
further enhances it relative to separate returns. Each of the proposals 
assigns a $3,000 standard deduction per individual, or $6,000 per 
couple, for those married couples who use the combined return. 105 By 
102 See I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (I999). 
103 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. See also Christian, Liability, 
supra note 22, at 602 & n.308; Christian, supra note 6, at 27I-72 & nn.II3-I4. 
104 See supra note IOI and accompanying text. 
105 See e.g. S. I429, I 06th Cong. § 20 I; S. I7II, I 05th Con g. § 2; H.R. 
3059, I05th Cong. § 2; S. 13I4, I05th Cong. § 2; H.R. 2456, I05th Cong. § 2; H.R. 2462, 
I05th Cong. § 2. With respect to the combined return, subsection (c) of each bill 
essentially provides: 
Basic Standard Deduction for Unmarried Individuals Made 
Applicable. - Subparagraph (C) of section 63(c)(2) is amended to read as 
follows: 
(C) $3,000 in the case of an individual other than -
(i) a married individual filing a return which is not a 
combined return under section 6013A, 
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contrast, a couple filing the traditional ~oint return remains entitled to 
a standard deduction of only $5,000. 06 Similarly, a couple filing 
separately remains entitled to standard deductions of only $2,500 per 
return, 107 or $5,000 per couple. Because the total standard deduction 
under the combined return exceeds that available for couples who file 
separately, these proposals further favor the combined return. over 
separate ones. Because of this aspect of the proposals, even more 
couples will file jointly under the new, combined return than 
separately and even more couples will be subject to joint and several 
liability .108 
b) Approach 2: Married couples may choose from among filing 
jointly, separately, or under a new, combined return which splits 
income using the rates applicable to unmarried couples 
One recent bill uses a slightly different approach to eliminate 
the marriage penalty that arises from the rate structure. 109 Alarmingly, 
this proposal would likely significantly increase the incidence of joint 
and several liability. Although this approach retains the traditional 
joint return as well as separate returns, it creates a new, combined 
return 110 that generates tax liabilities lower than either of those other 
(ii) a surviving spouse, or 
(iii) a head of household, or ... 
The only categories of filers other than those described in parts (i), (ii), and (iii), above, 
are individuals filing the new, combined return and single individuals. Thus, each 
individual who files a combined return with his or her spouse would be entitled to a 
$3,000 standard deduction. Proposed section 6013A(c)(6), stating "section 63 shall be 
applied as if such spouses were not married ... [,]" confirms that each spouse would be 
entitled to the $3,000 standard deduction. Thus, a couple filing the new, combined return 
would be entitled to a combined standard deduction allowance of $6,000. /d. 
106 See I.R.C. § 63(c)(2)(A) (1999) ("For purposes of paragraph (1), the basic 
standard deduction is ... $5,000 in the case of(i) a joint return."). 
107 See I.R.C. § 63(c)(2)(D) (1999) ("For purposes of paragraph (I), the basic 
standard deduction is ... $2,500 in the case of a married individual filing a separate 
return."). 
108 See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
109 See Marriage Tax Elimination Act, S. 1285, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997). 
110 SeeS. 1285, 105th Cong. § 2 (proposing a new I.R.C. § 6013A resulting 
in a new, combined return for married taxpayers). 
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options and lower than the rates applicable to unmarried couples. The 
proposal essentially creates a new filing status for married couples 
under which each spouse is treated as if he or she earned half of the 
couple's combined taxable income. 111 The tax rates in place for single 
individuals are then applied to those taxable incomes,112 and the two 
resulting tax liabilities are then added together. 113 This proposal 
essentially· uses the concepts of aggregation and income splitting 
under which joint rates relate to separate rates to create a new rate 
schedule that is related to single rates. Under it, couples are required 
to aggregate their incomes on one return. The new applicable tax 
rates, however, rise half as quickly as single rates - that is, tax 
brackets in the new schedule are twice as wide as the brackets for 
unmarried individuals to allow for income splitting. This new, 
combined return essentially allows income splitting, but uses single 
rates, rather than separate return rates, as a base. Because single rates 
are already lower than separate rates, 114 the new, combined return 
always generates lower tax liabilities than those of the traditional joint 
return. 
in part: 
The tax liabilities resulting under the new, combined return 
111 SeeS. 1285, 105th Cong. § 2 (proposing a new I.R.C. § 6013A providing, 
(a) General Rule. -A husband and wife may make a combined 
return.of income taxes under subtitle A under which-
(I) a separate taxable income is determined for each spouse by 
applying the rules provided in this section, ... 
(b) Determination ofTaxable Income.-
(I) IN GENERAL. -For purposes of subsection (a)(l), the taxable 
income for each spouse shall be one-half of the taxable income 
computed as if the spouses were filing a joint return.). 
112 See S. 1285, 105th Congress § 2 (proposing a new I.R.C. § 6013A 
providing, in part: 
(a) GENERAL RULE. -A husband and wife may make a combined 
return of income taxes under subtitle A under which - ... 
(2) the tax imposed by section I is the aggregate amount resulting 
from applying the separate rates set forth in section l(c) [referring 
to rates applicable to unmarried individuals] to each such taxable 
income.). 
113 s 'd ee 1 . 
114 See supra Graph 2. 
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also fall below the liabilities for single couples. This bill, therefore, 
eliminates the marriage penalty that results from the rate structure. It 
exacerbates marriage bonuses, however, allowing all couples to enjoy 
larger bonuses. 
The relative tax liabilities for· the various filing statuses 





Again, predicting which filing status couples will select under 
this approach to marriage penalty relief requires an assumption that 
spouses choose the status minimizing combined tax liability. As 
Graph 4 clearly demonstrates, the new, combined return generates tax 
liabilities far below those of the traditional joint return and even 
farther below those of separate returns, regardless of the distribution 
of earnings between the two spouses. All couples, whether spousal 
incomes differ or are similar, would likely select this new, combined 
return. This proposed rate structure favors the new, combined return 
so much more than separate returns, it is exceedingly unlikely that any 
couple would ever find it advantageous to file separately. 
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Moreover, this proposal, like those of Approach I described 
above, adopts a standard deduction which further reinforces the 
preference for the combined return relative to separate returns. The 
proposal instructs married couples filing the combined returnto take a 
standard deduction of twice the $3,000 amount available to unmarried 
individuals.115 Thus, a couple utilizing the combined return would be 
entitled to $6,000 in standard deductions. By contrast, married 
couples filing jointly or separately would continue to be allowed only 
$5,000 per couple. 116 Because the aggregate standard deduction under 
the combined return exceeds that available for couples who file 
separately, these proposals further favor the combined return over 
separate ones. Even more couples will file jointly under the new, 
combined return than separately because of this aspect of the bill. 
Under this proposal, the new, combined return is treated as a 
joint return and, therefore, triggers joint and several liability .117 As a 
result, this proposal would likely increase significantly the number of 
couples who would be subject to joint and several liability. Almost all 
couples who currently file separately would opt, instead, for the new, 
combined return and would find themselves governed by the rule of 
joint and severalliability.118 
115 See Marriage Tax Elimination Act, S. 1285, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997) 
(stating in proposed section 60 13A(b )(2): 
NONITEMIZERS - For purposes of paragraph (I) [relating to the 
determination of taxable income for each spouse], if an election 
is made not to itemize deductions for any taxable year, the basic 
standard deduction shall be equal to the amount which is twice 
the basic standard deduction under section 63(c)(2)(C) [relating 
to the standard deduction for unmarried individuals] for the 
taxable year.). 
116 See supra notes 106-07. 
117 . 
See S. 1285, 105th § 2 (stating in proposed section 6013A(d): 
"TREATMENT As JotNT RETURN. - Except as otherwise provided in this section or in the 
regulations prescribed hereunder, for purposes of this title (other than sections I and 
63(c)) a combined return under this section shall be treated as a joint return)."). Thus, for 
purposes of I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3), the new, combined return would be treated as a joint 
return and would precipitate joint and several liability. /d. 
118 See I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (1999). 
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c) Approach 3: Joint return rates are reduced so they represent 
the income splitting result using unmarried rates as a base 
Recently proposed is a variation of Approach 2, described 
above. Like Approach 2, this reform proposal would significantly 
increase the number of couples who would find themselves subject to 
joint and several liability. Rather than adding a new, combined return, 
this third method119 to eliminate the marriage penalty would reduce 
the rates for the traditional joint return until they matched those of the 
combined return in Approach 2, above. Thus, two filing statuses 
would be available to married couples as opposed to three in 
Approach 2, above. Yet the joint return would generate tax bills 
identical to those of the combined return introduced above. More 
precisely, this proposal requires the brackets for joint rates to be twice 
as wide as the brackets for rates applicable to unmarried 
individuals. 120 By the time these hew joint rates would be fully 
phased in, the rate structure would appear as follows: 
119 American Values Tax Savings Plan for the 21st Century, H.R. 2350, 
I 06th Cong. § I 02 (1999). 
I (f)(8): 
120 See H.R. 2350, 106th Cong. § I02(a) (providing in proposed section 
ELIMINATION OF MARRIAGE PENALTY. - In prescribing the table 
under paragraph (I) which applies in lieu of the table contained 
in subsection (a) [referring to joint return tax brackets and rates] 
with respect to taxable years beginning in a calendar year after 
2004, the minimum and maximum dollar amounts for each rate 
bracket shall be twice the minimum and maximum dollar 
amounts (respectively) prescribed by the Secretary under this 
subsection for the comparable rate·bracket under subsection (c) 
[referring to rates and brackets applicable to unmarried 
individuals] for such taxable years.). 
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(Old MFJ- no longer exists) 
New MFJ 
This rate structure eliminates the marriage penalty while 
retaining, indeed, increasing marriage bonuses. More alarmingly, this 
rate structure makes the joint return even more attractive relative to 
separate returns than it is under current law. As in Approach 2, above, 
not only would disparate-income couples retain an incentive to file 
jointly, but similar-income couples who for reasons unrelated to the 
rate structure occasionally favor the separate return, 121 would have a 
greater incentive to adopt the joint return instead. Undoubtedly, more 
couples than under current law would file jointly. More couples, 
consequently, would find themselves subject to the law of joint and 
several liability. 122 
d) Approach 4: Separate return rates and unmarried rates are 
made equivalent 
A fourth group of marriage penalty relief proposals fails to 
reduce the incidence of the joint return and of joint and several 
121 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
122 See I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (1999). 
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liability. These bills eliminate the rate structure's marriage penalty 
simply by equating the rates that apply to separately filing married 
couples with those applicable to single taxpayers. 123 Under these 
proposals, joint return rates still relate to separate return rates through 
the concepts of income splitting and aggregation. Thus, joint rates 
compare to single rates in the same manner. The rate brackets for the 
joint return are twice as wide as those for separate or single returns. 124 
Graph 6, below, illustrates the relationship among the rates for the 





The graph demonstrates that under this approach to marriage 
penalty relief, the rates no longer cause a marriage penalty for any 
couple, regardless of the distribution of earnings between the two 
spouses. Joint return liabilities never exceed those of single couples. 
123 . 
Top Ten Terrible Tax Act of 1999, H.R. 2414, 106th Cong, § 5(a) ( 1999); 
Marriage Tax Elimination Act of 1999, H.R. 6, I 06th Cong. § 2 ( 1999); Marriage Tax 
Penalty Elimination Act of 1999, S. 12, I06th Cong. § 2 ( 1999); Marriage Tax Penalty 
Elimination Act of 1998, H.R. 3734, 105th Cong. § 2 (1998); Marriage Tax Penalty 
Elimination Act of 1998, S. 1999, I 05th Cong. § 2 ( 1998); Gephardt 10 Percent Tax Act 
of 1998, H.R. 3620, I 05th Con g. § I 0 I (1998). 
124 See generally supra note 123. For each bill compare proposed I.R.C. § 
l(a) containing joint return brackets with proposed I.R.C. § l(c) containing the brackets 
advanced both for married separate filers and for single individuals. 
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All couples except those in which spouses' incomes are identical, 
however, experience a marriage bonus. 
The effect of this approach on a married couple's selection of 
filing status is easily discerned from Graph 6, above. As under the 
current system, joint returns continue to produce a lower liability than 
separate returns for all but equal-income married couples. Thus, as 
under current law,125 the vast majority of couples will have an 
incentive to file jointly rather than separately. As for equal-income 
couples, they will continue to be indifferent between the joint and 
separate returns. Under this fourth approach to eliminating the rate 
structure marriage penalty, most couples will continue to use the joint 
return, and thus, most will continue to be vulnerable to joint and 
several liability. 126 
e) Approach 5: Separate return rates and unmarried rates are 
made equivalent but joint liabilities increase for upper-income 
couples 
Interestingly, under a fifth approach to marriage penalty relief, 
a few couples would be encouraged to abandon the joint return and 
file separately, thereby, avoiding joint and several liability. 
Unfortunately, this incentive would apply to too few couples; the vast 
majority would continue to file jointly and would remain under the 
regime of joint and several liability. This fifth approach 127 is similar 
to the one just described for families with combined taxable incomes 
up to and including $102,300. For those couples, separate rates are 
made equivalent to those of single individuals, 128 and joint rates may 
be derived from either through income splitting and aggregation. 
Again, the rate brackets for joint returns, up to the $102,300 combined 
income level, are twice as wide as those for separate returns and single 
125 See supra Part II.A. 
126 See I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (1999). 
127 See Middle Class Tax Relief Act of 1998, H.R. 3151, 105th Cong. § 3 
( 1998). 
128 See id. (proposing amendment to I.R.C. § l(c) resulting in new rate 
schedule applicable to both single individuals and married separate filers). 
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returns. 129 Thus, for those couples, marriage bonuses persist, marriage 
penalties are eliminated, and joint returns remain more attractive than 
separate ones. 13° Consequently, most couples in this income range 
will select the joint return and will be subject to joint and several 
liability .131 
For couples with combined taxable incomes above $1 02,300, 
the joint return tax brackets are less than twice as wide as the brackets 
applicable to similar separate filers. 132 Income splitting is only 
partially available. As a consequence, the joint return liability for a 
couple whose combined taxable income exceeds $1 02,300 would 
exceed what income splitting would have produced. Since the joint 
return brackets are less than twice as wide as those for separate filers, 
income gets pushed into higher rate brackets faster than it would have 
under the income splitting system. More income is subjected to the 
higher rate brackets, and as a result, joint return liability is greater 
than it would have been had income splitting been wholly available. 
For a couple with combined taxable income of slightly more 
than $102,300, the relative tax liabilities for disparate- and similar-
income couples would appear as follows: 
129 See id. Compare proposed § l(a) up to income level of $102,300, 
containing joint return brackets, with proposed § I (c) up to income level of $51,150, 
containing the brackets advanced both for married separate filers and for single 
individuals. 
130 See supra Graph 6. Of course, joint returns are more attractive than 
separate ones only for those couples with combined taxable incomes up to $102,300 for 
whom spouses' incomes are not exactly identical. For equal-income couples, separate 
returns are as attractive as joint returns. 
131 See I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (1999). 
132 See Middle Class Tax Relief Act of 1998, H.R. 3151, 105th Cong. §3 
( 1998). Compare proposed I.R.C. § I (a) above income level of $102,300, containing 
joint return brackets, with proposed I.R.C. § l(c) above income level of $51,150, 
containing the brackets proposed for married separate filers and single taxpayers. 
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With regard to the goal of marriage neutrality, this rate 
structure retains marriage bonuses for disparate-income couples, but 
eliminates the marriage penalty for similar- or equal-income couples. 
Those equal-income couples for whom the joint return liability 
exceeds the tax bill for an unmarried couple will file separately when 
married, thus, incurring no more liability than if they remained single. 
They experience neither a marriage penalty nor a marriage bonus. 
Interestingly, the larger a couple's combined taxable income 
under this approach, the less tax savings is available by filing jointly 
since a greater portion of the couple's income falls within the range in 
which income splitting is not wholly available. Thus, the larger the 
combined income ·for the couple; the higher the joint return liability, 
the closer that liability is to the higher end of the separate liability 
range, and the farther it is from the low end of the separate liability 
range. Thus, for a couple with combined taxable income greatly 
exceeding $102,300, the relative tax liabilities for disparate- and 
similar-income couples would appear as shown below: 
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At this income level, most married couples neither suffer a 
marriage penalty nor enjoy a marriage bonus. Most would file 
separately and experience true marriage neutrality. Only couples with 
extremely divergent incomes would continue to experience a marriage 
bonus, but none would incur a marriage penalty. 
Under Approach 5, the likelihood of filing jointly changes as 
the income level rises above $102,300. A couple in which combined 
income only slightly exceeds $102,300 would likely file jointly unless 
spousal incomes were very similar. 133 If spousal incomes were close 
to identical, however, the proposed rate structure would actually 
encourage a couple at this combined income level to file separately. 134 
For the first time since 1948, the rate structure would affirmatively 
encourage some couples, albeit only similar-income couples, to file in 
a manner under which they would not be exposed to the regime of 
joint and several liability. 
133 See supra Graph 7. 
134s .d ee 1 . 
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The higher the couple's combined income level, the more the 
spouses' incomes can diverge before the couple loses the incentive to 
file separately. As can be observed from Graph 8, above, couples in 
which spouses' incomes diverge significantly continue to generate a 
lower tax liability by filing jointly than by filing separately. However, 
most couples across the spectrum of the diagram, that is, couples in 
which incomes diverge somewhat and couples in which incomes are 
similar or equal, benefit more from filing separately than jointly. At 
extremely high income levels, the instant rate structure actually 
encourages perhaps a significant number of couples to file separately. 
Many couples at this income level would be able to file in a manner 
that precludes the application of joint and several liability. Of course, 
the number of couples at such high income levels and in which 
spousal incomes are similar or somewhat divergent may not be very 
large. 
Although this proposal does encourage certain married 
couples to file separately and thereby avoid joint and several liability, 
it· is too small a step in the right direction. As demonstrated above, 
this benefit is limited to a relatively small portion of the American 
married population. It is limited to couples in which combined 
taxable incomes exceed $102,300, and even then only to couples on 
the right side of the graph, those with similar incomes. Although a 
few couples under this approach would be encouraged to file 
separately, far too many couples would retain the incentive to file 
jointly. Far too many would remain endangered by the onerous joint 
and several liability system. 135 
f) Approach 6: Joint and separate return rates remain unchanged, 
but single rates act differently at different levels of combined 
income 
In another proposal for marriage penalty relief, 136 joint and 
separate rates remain as they are under current law. Consequently, 
this proposal does nothing to reduce the use of the joint return or the 
135 See I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (1999). 
136 See Middle Class Tax Relief Act of 1999, H.R. 767, 106th Cong. § 3 
(1999). 
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incidence of joint' and several liability. Under this proposal, joint 
brackets are twice as wide as those of the separate .rate schedule. 137 
Here, income splitting is present in the rate structure for all combined 
income levels. This proposal addresses the marriage penalty, then, by 
adjusting the rates applicable to unmarried taxpayers. 
Under this bill, the rates applicable to unmarried individuals 
are identical to separate return rates for couples with combined 
taxable incomes up to and including $52,025. 138 Thus, tax liabilities 






Graph 9 confirms that within the $52,025 ·combined income 
range, this proposal eliminates the marriage penalty found in the rate 
structure, but it retains marriage bonuses for all but equal-income 
couples. 
For couples with combined incomes above $52,025, the rate 
brackets for single taxpayers are wider than those for married separate . 
137 See id. Compare proposed § l(a) containing joint return brackets with 
proposed l.R.C. § l(d) constituting the tax brackets for married separate filers. 
138 See H.R. 767, 106th Cong. § 3. Compare proposed l.R.C. § l(c) up to · 
income level of $52,025, containing rate brackets for single filers, with proposed l.R.C. § 
l(d) up to $52,025 income level, providing rate brackets for married separate filers. The 
two schedules depart from each other above the $52,025 taxable income level. 
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filers. 139 Thus, for any individual with taxable income exceeding 
$52,025, tax liability as a single individual would be less than under 
the married separate return. 140 
Single tax liabilities and separate return liabilities begin to 
differ from each other over the range of combined taxable income 
from just over $52,025 up to and including $104,050. Whether the 
two rates are equivalent or generate different tax liabilities within this 
range depends on whether the spouse being taxed is part of a similar-
income couple or a disparate-income couple. To elaborate, whenever 
a spouse earns more than $52,025 of taxable income, the separate 
return rate schedule pushes that spouse into the 31% bracket, 141 
whereas the single rate schedule imposes a marginal tax rate of only 
28%. 142 For such an individual, the single filing status would produce 
a better result than would the separate return. The superiority of 
single rates over separate return rates occurs for different couples 
depending on their distribution of earnings along the range of 
combined incomes from $52,026 through $1 04,050. 
For couples with a combined income of $52,026, only at the 
most disparate earning pattern, $52,026 for one spouse and no 
earnings for the other spouse, can the first spouse earn more than 
$52,025 and be pushed from the 28% bracket as a single taxpayer into 
the 31% bracket as a separate filer. Single return liability is more 
advantageous than the separate return result at this income level, but 
only for the most disparately earning of couples. For other couples 
across the earnings-distribution spectrum, the single return generates 
139 See H.R. 767, 106th Cong. §3. Compare proposed I.R.C. § l(c) above 
$52,025 income level, brackets for single filers, with proposed I.R.C. §l(d) above 
$52,025 income level, brackets for married separate filers. 
140 Tax liability as a single individual would be less than that for a married 
separate filer because as income rises the narrower brackets under the separate return 
would push income into higher tax brackets faster than it would under the wider brackets 
for single taxpayers. See H.R. 767, 106th Cong. § 3(a) (proposed I.R.C. §§ l(c) & (d)). 
141 See id (proposing amendment to I.R.C. §J(d) containing brackets for 
married separate filers) ("If taxable income is: Over $52,025 but not over $79,275[,] 
[then] [t]he tax is: $10,017, plus 31% of the excess over $52,025.") (emphasis added). 
142 See id (proposing amendment to I.R.C. § l(c) containing brackets for 
unmarried individuals) ("If taxable income is: Over $35,000 but not over $62,450[,] 
[then] [t]he tax is: $5,250, plus 28% of the excess over $35,000.") (emphasis added). 
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At somewhat higher levels of combined taxable income, one 
spouse would be able earn more than $52,025, thereby causing a 
difference between the tax liabilities generated under the separate 
return and single rates, 144 in more than merely those cases of complete 
spousal income disparity. Because combined income would be higher 
in this instance, one spouse could have taxable income above $52,025 
143 The single return liability is the same as the separate ret~rn liability for 
these other couples because in their cases, no spouse earns more than $52,025. Under 
either rate schedule, ·single or separate, the highest marginal rate that could apply to 
anyone would be 28%. The· 31% rate from the separate return schedule would never be 
triggered because no one earns more than $52,025. See H.R. 767, 106th Cong. § 3(a) 
(proposed J.R.C. §§ l(c) & (d)). 
144 By earning more tha11 $52,025 a spouse would fall in the 31% bracket by 
filing separately versus experiencing a 28% marginal rate as a single taxpayer. See H.R. 
767, 106th Cong. § 3(a) (proposed I.R.C. §§ l(c) & (d)) .. 
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even if the other spouse had some earnings of her own, that is, even if 
incomes were not completely disparate. The relative tax liabilities for 
disparate- and similar-income couples whose combined income is 







The greater the level of combined taxable income, the greater 
would be the number of couples across the earnings-distribution 
continuum that would benefit from filing as single taxpayers rather 
than married separate filers. When combined income levels reach 
$104,050, one spouse will necessarily earn more than $52,025, and 
thus be subject to a 31% bracket in the separate return versus a 28% 
bracket in the single return. This statement would be true for all 
couples except those in which spouses' incomes are exactly equal. 145 
For all but equal-income couples, therefore, single rates would 
generate a lower tax liability than would rates under the separate 
145 At $104,050, neither spouse would earn more than $52,025 if incomes are 
distributed equally. Rather, each spouse would earn exactly $52,025, and both would fall 
into the 28% bracket whether they file separately or as single individuals. See id. 
(proposed I.R.C. §§ l(c) & (d)). 
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Notice that during the range of combined incomes from 
$52,025 to $104,050, marriage penalties do not exist. Marriage 
bonuses, however, are available to all but equal-income married 
couples. 
When combined taxable income exceeds $104,050, at least 
one spouse will always earn more than $52,025. Such is the case for 
every couple, regardless of the distribution of earnings between 
spouses. 146 Thus, at combined income levels above $104,050, single 
rates will produce a lower tax liability than separate returns for all 
couples across the continuum. Joint rates continue to relate to 
separate rates through income splitting and aggregation. This pattern 
appears below: 
146 E I. I . . h ven equa -mcome coup es must contam a spouse earnmg more t an 
$52,025 if combined income exceeds $104,050. If combined income is $104,051, for 
example, the spouses in an equal-income couple would each earn $52,025.50 and would 
each be pushed into the 31% bracket filing separately rather than the 28% bracket that 
would apply if they were single. See Middle Class Tax Relief Act of 1999, H.R. 767, 
106th Cong. § 3(a) (proposed I.R.C. §§ l(c) & (d)). 
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Graph 13. 
Once again, a marriage bonus is present for most couples. 
Furthermore, as the graph demonstrates, at combined income levels 
above $104,050, a marriage penalty reemerges for similar-income 
couples. 
As combined income levels increase even more, the single 
return liabilities become more and more advantageous relative to 
separate return liabilities. The advantage for unmarried couples 
results because at incomes above $52,025 per individual or $104,050 
per couple, the single rate brackets become wider than those of the 
separate return schedule. 147 As combined incomes rise further and 
further above $104,050 per couple, income gets pushed into higher 
brackets slowly for unmarried couples, but more quickly for married 
separate filers. Essentially, the rates for single individuals are flatter 
than those for separate filers. As combined income increases, a 
147 See H.R. 767, 106th Cong. Compare proposed I.R.C. § l(c) above 
income level of $52,025, containing brackets for unmarried individuals, with proposed 
I.R.C. § l(d) above income level of $52,025, containing brackets for married separate 
filers. 
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greater portion of that income falls in the portion of the rate schedules 
which favor single taxpayers over married separate filers. As a result, 
the single liability line moves lower relative to the separate return 
liability line. Graph 14, below, illustrates how the single liability line 
would drop relative to the separate return liability when combined 




As combined incomes rise, more and more couples experience 
a marriage penalty. Only the disparate-income couple retains its 
advantageous marriage bonus. 
Regardless of how single rates behave in the different 
combined income ranges, joint and separate rates continue to be 
related to each other throughout all income levels through income 
splitting and aggregation. 148 The joint return thus generates a lower 
tax liability than do separate returns for all couples except those in 
which incomes are exactly equal. Thus, most couples will continue to 
choose the joint return under this approach to marriage penalty relief. 
Unfortunately, most will continue to be subject to joint and several 
148 See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
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liability .149 
IV. CONCLUSION. 
Amending the tax code to solve one problem, the marriage 
penalty, can have unintended consequences of which Congress and 
the public should be aware. Correcting one flaw may actually 
increase the incidence of other hidden concerns, in this case joint and 
several liability. For those taxpayers against whom the IRS asserts 
joint and several liability, that regime is potentially much more 
financially devastating than the traditional marriage penalties would 
have been. Joint and several liability exposes a non-delinquent spouse 
to potentially unlimited liability, 150 whereas, the marriage penalty 
creates a fixed and usually relatively inexpensive charge. 151 Thus, the 
149 See I.R.C. § 60I3(d)(3) (I999). 
150 The potential cost of joint and several liability to the non-delinquent 
spouse is limited only by the amount of the deficiency, interest, and penalties the IRS 
decides to assert against her. Cases exist in which the IRS has sought payment from the 
non-delinquent spouse even though the tax deficiency exceeded her means manyfold. See 
e.g., Kathy M. Kristof, Taxpayer Stuck in IRS' Narrow Escape Clause, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 
20, 1996, at 02 (describing a case in which the IRS sought from a woman payment of her 
ex-husband's tax deficiency, ten years of interest, and penalties although her sole source 
of support was a meager monthly social security check and income from a modest IOU). 
151 The marriage penalty caused by the rate structure may amount to a small 
portion of a couple's combined taxable income. For example, a couple in which one 
spouse earns $80,000 and the other earns $40,000 would experience a marriage penalty 
from the rate structure of just over $I ,000, or less than I% of combined taxable income. 
See Christian, supra note 6, at 276 tb1.3. The marriage penalty does not always constitute 
such a small portion of a couple's combined income, however. In fact, the marriage 
penalty arising in connection with the EITC can amount to an extremely high percentage 
of income. See Ellen E. Schultz, Living in Sin to Cut Tax Bill Would Look Even Better to 
Some Under Clinton Plan, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 1993, at Cl "Calculations prepared for 
The Wall Street Journal by KPMG Peat Marwick show that the marriage penalty has the 
greatest impact on the lowest wage earners with children." /d. As a percentage of 
income, the EITC marriage penalty is among the largest imposed in the tax system. See 
Brown, supra note 45, at 1479; CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE 
REVENUE PROVISIONS OF OBRA-93, at 37-40 ( 1994 ). In some cases the marriage penalty 
for low-income taxpayers is estimated to be as high as 9% of total gross income. See 
Middle-Income Tax Proposals: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 104th 
Con g. 48 ( 1995) (statement of Deborah H. Schenk); Alstott, supra note 45, at 562; 
Jonathan Ba~ry Forman, Simplification for Low-Income Taxpayers: Some Options, 57 
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. cure and its increased incidence of joint and several liability may be 
worse, as a policy matter, than the original illness the marriage 
penalty presents. 
In fact, joint and several liability can be viewed as a sort of 
marriage penalty in itself in that it is imposed only on taxpayers who 
have married. 152 It does not apply to single taxpayers. It does not 
apply to married separate filers either. Nevertheless, because the tax 
system is structured to impose an overwhelming incentive on married 
couples to file jointly rather than separately, 153 marrying almost 
guarantees joint filing 154 and the applicability of joint and several 
liability. 155 
·. In addressing the traditional sources of the marriage penalty, 
Congress has failed to repeal this other potentially more severe 
marriage penalty -joint and several liability. 156 In fact, as this 
Article demonstrates, most of Congress' proposals for marriage 
penalty relief would actually aggravate the marriage penalty of join,t 
and several liability by increasing its prevalence. Most approaches to 
marriage penalty relief would cause this other penalty of marriage to 
apply to even more couples than under current law by making the 
OHIO ST. L.J. 145, 184 (1996); McCaffery, supra note 3, at 995, 1015-16; Zelenak, supra 
note 3, at 364. 
152 See Symposium: supra note I, at 167, 196 (comments of Richard C.E. 
Beck); Amy C. Christian, Lurking Marriage Penalty, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 23, 1999, at Al4. 
Ironically, joint and several liability penalizes marriage in a second way, too. When a 
rule is enforced against one spouse because of the other's tax deficiency,. the best option 
may be for the couple to divorce. See Christian, supra note 2, at 49. The divorcing 
spouses then may utilize a much fairer system, proportional liability, provided they meet 
certain requirements. See I.R.C. § 6015(a)(2) and (c) (1999). Under proportional 
liability, each spouse can be held liable only for taxes resulting from his or her own 
income and deductions, not for taxes created by the errors and omissions of the other 
spouse. See id. Proportional liability is not available, however, to couples who stay 
married. See id. Paradoxically, by treating divorcing couples more fairly than those who. 
remain married, our current tax system encourages divorce and penalizes marriage. 
153 See supra Part Il.A. 
154 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
155 See I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (1999). 
156 None of the marriage penalty proposals introduced in Congress would 
repeal I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3), the provision imposing joint and several liability on joint 
filers. 
HeinOnline -- 16 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 357 1999-2000
1999] LEGISLATION AND FILING STATUS 357 
joint return relatively more attractive than it already is. 
Congress should address the marriage penalty, but it should do 
so in a manner that avoids exacerbating other problems. It could 
accomplish this dual goal by simultaneously enacting marriage 
penalty relief and repealing joint and several liability .157 In that case, 
marriage penalty relief could never expose more couples to joint and 
several liability even if it did encourage more to file jointly. 
Should Congress decline to repeal joint and several liability, it 
could avoid intensifying its prevalence by making marriage penalty 
relief available not solely for joint filers but also for those spouses 
who file separately:158 In the case of the marriage penalty that results 
from the rate structure, Congress could enact marriage penalty relief 
that also makes separate return rates more advantageous than under 
current law. As legislators fashion a solution to the unpopular 
marriage penalty, they should safeguard their constituents from the 
harmful and unintended consequences found in most previous 
approaches. 
157 Both the ABA and the AICPA have recommended the repeal of joint and 
several liability. In February of 1995, the ABA House ()f Delegates adopted the 
following resolution: 
RESOLVED that the American Bar Association recommends to 
the Congress that sections 6013(d) and' (e) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 be repealed (i) to eliminate joint and 
several liability of a taxpayer who has signed a joint return with 
his or her spouse for tax on income properly attributable to his or 
her spouse, (ii) to substitute separate liability for tax shown to be 
due on the'joint return, and (iii) to repeal innocent spouse relief 
froni liability for tax on the joint return when the liability arises 
from erroneous items of the taxpayer's spouse. 
ABA Sec. of Tax'n, Domestic Relations Comm., Comments on Liability of Divorced 
Spouses for Tax Deficiencies on Previously Filed Joint Returns, reprinted in 50 TAX 
LAW. 395,395 (1997). In comments submitted to the IRS, the AICPA also recommended 
repealing joint and several liability, or in the alternative, eliminating joint returns 
altogether. See Ken Rankin, A/CPA Advises IRS on Fairer Divorce Procedures, AccT. 
TODAY, July 29, 1996, at 8, available in 1996 WL 8970070. Congress has declined to 
eliminate joint and several liability, however. See I.R.C. §§ 6013(d)(3) and 6015 (1999) 
(retaining the regime of joint and several liability). 
158 For example, in the case of the two-earner deduction or credit, Congress 
could enact a version that does not condition the availability of the tax benefit upon use of 
the joint return. I.e., such a deduction or credit could be made available to separate filers. 
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